Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 40
Issue 4 Summer 2009

Article 8

2009

Free to Litigate or Free from Litigation: Balancing
Plaintiff 's Rights with Court Considerations and
Defendants' Interests in Hudson v. City of Chicago
Anne Leigh Drushal
Loyola University Chicago, School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Litigation Commons
Recommended Citation
Anne L. Drushal, Free to Litigate or Free from Litigation: Balancing Plaintiff's Rights with Court Considerations and Defendants' Interests in
Hudson v. City of Chicago, 40 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 995 (2009).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol40/iss4/8

This Mentorship Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University
Chicago Law Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

Free to Litigate or Free from Litigation: Balancing
Plaintiffs' Rights with Court Considerations and
Defendants' Interests in Hudson v. City of Chicago
Anne Leigh Drushal*
Mentored by Judge Diane Larsen**

I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of res judicata and the rule against claim splitting
require a plaintiff to plead and to litigate all relevant claims in the same
action. 1 The general goals of these two rules are to ensure accuracy,
efficiency, and fairness in the legal system. 2 Even though these three
goals should work in tandem, courts have begun placing paramount
importance upon the concept of efficiency, or judicial economy. 3 This
I would like to thank John M. Wunderlich and Judge Diane
Larsen for their feedback and support throughout this process. I would also like to thank my
family, especially my husband, Rick, for all of their love and support.
** Judge Diane Larsen has been a Law Division Judge in Cook County for the past 10 years
and was the Chief of Policy Litigation for the City of Chicago Law Department prior to serving
as a judge.
1. See Barbara Anderson Gimbel, The Res Judicata Doctrine Under Illinois and Federal Law:
A Step-by-Step Review of the Res JudicataDoctrine and its Development and Application Under
Common Law, 88 ILL. B.J. 404, 405 (2000) ("[R]es judicata may extend not only to every matter
that was determined in the prior lawsuit but to every matter that might have been determined."
(citing River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 703 N.E.2d 883, 889 (Il. 1998))); see also
PETER R. BARNETT, RES JUDICATA, ESTOPPEL AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 119-20 (2001)
(describing res judicata as including the issue of claim splitting because "one inseparable claim"
cannot be split into two partial claims without a judgment from another partial claim applying to
the newly filed partial claim).
2. See Robert Ziff, For One Litigant's Sole Relief.- Unforeseeable Preclusionand the Second
Restatement, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 910-11 (1992) (stating that accuracy refers to an
"accurate resolution of the merits of a case"; efficiency is "minimizing the direct costs of
litigation," both direct and peripheral; and fairness narrowly refers to the "basic expectations of
the parties").
3. See LISA A. KLOPPENBERG, PLAYING IT SAFE: HOW THE SUPREME COURT SIDESTEPS
HARD CASES AND STUNTS THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW 1 (2001) (detailing the different
mechanisms the Supreme Court of the United States will use to avoid deciding an issue and
discussing the Court's reasons behind these avoidances, such as judicial economy); Ziff, supra
note 2, at 905 ("[Cjourts occasionally preclude [similar but not identical claims] by developing
* J.D. expected May, 2010.
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change is evidenced by the Illinois Supreme Court's recent decision in
Hudson v. City of Chicago, where the court dramatically curbed the
right to refile voluntarily dismissed litigation in the name of judicial
4
economy.
The concept of finality in litigation is inextricably tied to judicial
economy, and while there ought to be finality in litigation, the goal of a
clear docket should not validate the mechanical application of res
judicata at the expense of fundamental fairness. 5 Instead, courts should
balance the interests of judicial economy equally with other litigants'
rights.6 This balance is especially important because the right to refile
7
voluntarily dismissed claims has been previously declared absolute.
As this Note will discuss, however, in Hudson, the right to refile
voluntarily dismissed litigation in Illinois was inappropriately limited

through a mechanical application of res judicata principles. 8 The court
novel exceptions to the established limitations of res judicata law."). See also Zuniga v. Dwyer,
752 N.E.2d 491, 495 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2001) (disallowing any practice that would "necessarily lead to
increased litigation costs, demand on limited judicial time and resources and potential for double
recovery that our supreme court has determined to avoid"). This change reflects a concern
regarding over-crowded dockets: 773,204 civil cases were filed in Illinois in 2007 with 732,016
of these filings disposed of prior to trial. State of Illinois, Illinois Circuit Court Statistics,
http://www.state.il.us/court/circuitcourt/CCStats.asp (last visited Feb. 12, 2008). This concern
over volume is only slightly less striking in federal court, where there were 257,507 civil filings
in 2007. U.S. Courts, JudicialCaseload Profile,All Districts,in FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT
STATISTICs 2007 (2008), availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsd2007.pl.
4. See Hudson v. City of Chicago, 889 N.E.2d 210, 222-23 (Il. 2008) (holding that a
plaintiff's right to refile their voluntarily dismissed claims is barred if an involuntary judgment
has been entered on any part of the preceding litigation).
5. Dutch D. Chung, Note, The Preclusive Effect of State Court Adjudication of Patent Issues
and the FederalCourts' Choice of Preclusion Laws, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 707, 732 (2000) ("The
finality of decisions promotes judicial economy and fairness to all parties by preventing repetitive
and vexatious litigation and encouraging litigants to resolve all of their disputes within a single
litigation.").
6. See Michael E. Solimine & Amy E. Lippert, Deregulating Voluntary Dismissals, 36 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 367, 371-72 (2003) (discussing the history of the "unilateral right to
voluntarily dismiss" as a broad right subject to various conditions under statute as well as the
continuously tighter restrictions created by the courts); Markus May, Voluntary Dismissals in
Illinois-A CriticalReview, 92 ILL. B.J. 484, 489 (2004) (predicting the continued limitations of
the practice surrounding voluntary dismissals in Illinois by the courts and potentially the General
Assembly).
7. Flores v. Dugan, 435 N.E.2d 480, 482 (Il1. 1982) (holding that an order dismissing a cause
for want of prosecution is not a final and appealable order given plaintiff's "absolute" right to
refile the same claim against the same party). See also Wold v. Bull Valley Mgmt. Co., Inc., 449
N.E.2d 112, 113-14 (LIl. 1983) (upholding Flores and deciding that a plaintiffs absolute right to
refile trumps the plaintiff's own desire to appeal the granting of the order to dismiss); Case v.
Galesburg Cottage Hosp., 880 N.E.2d 171, 176 (II. 2007) (holding that the limitations statute
grants plaintiffs the absolute right to refile a voluntarily dismissed complaint).
8. See Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 213-14 (changing the previous understanding of refiling a
voluntarily dismissed claim as an "absolute right," by determining that a refiled voluntarily
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justified such a restrictive application out of concern for judicial
economy. 9 Part II of this Note first provides background on the rules
governing voluntary dismissals 10 and the doctrine of res judicata. I" Part
II also discusses the integral cases that preceded the court's decision in
Hudson.12 Next, Part III discusses the Hudson case, including its
factual background, 13 the appellate court decision, 14 and the Illinois
15
Supreme Court holding.

Part IV then asserts that the Hudson court wrongfully extended the
application of Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., an earlier Illinois Supreme
Court case.1 6 It then suggests that the Illinois General Assembly
intended to preserve a litigant's right to refile a voluntarily dismissed
claim. 17 Part IV also argues that, despite Hudson's stated aim of
promoting judicial economy, the decision is marred by the court's
overriding objective of curbing attorney abuses. 18 Finally, Part V
maintains that Hudson will impact motion practice by shifting the
balance between plaintiffs and defendants. 19 Additionally, Part V
concludes that Hudson is unlikely to meet the court's main goal of

promoting judicial economy.

20

dismissed claim is barred by any involuntary dismissal of another part of the suit).
9. See id. at 221 (asserting that a separate outcome, recommended by the Illinois Trial
Lawyer's Association, would "impair judicial economy").
10. See infra Part ll.A (describing the right to take a voluntary dismissal and to refile a
voluntarily dismissed claim).
11. See infra Part II.B (illustrating the doctrine of res judicata as a restriction on the right to
take and refile voluntarily dismissed claims, specifically, the final judgment element and the rule
against claim splitting).
12. See infra Part II.C (discussing Rein v. DavidA. Noyes & Co. and Piagentiniv. Ford Motor
Co.).
13. See infra Part III.A (providing the factual basis for the Hudson decision).
14. See infra Part III.B (discussing the undivided appellate court decision upholding the trial
court's order to dismiss the plaintiff s refiled claim under the doctrine of res judicata).
15. See infra Part II.C (detailing the majority opinion and dissenting opinions in Hudson).
16. See infa Part IV.A (asserting that the court in Hudson misapplied Rein to cases not
dealing with attorney negligence and the abuse of voluntary dismissals).
17. See infra Part IV.C (addressing the Illinois General Assembly's intention to allow
plaintiffs to refile voluntarily dismissed claims so long as the refiling complies with the statutory
provisions regulating the voluntary dismissal).
18. See infra Part IV.D (illustrating how the stated goals of the court do not apply to the
factual scenario presented by Hudson and providing more plausible unstated goals of the court in
its decision).
19. See infra Part V.A (discussing the potential impact of Hudson on the motion practice in
shifting the rights and responsibilities of plaintiffs and defendants as well as the role of the courts
in these situations).
20. See infra Part V.A-C (discussing the potential impact of Hudson on the motion practice
and further claims).
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II. BACKGROUND
Litigants are afforded a variety of legal rights. 2 1 Certain rights,

however, are considered absolute. 22 Two such absolute rights include:
(1) the plaintiff's right to voluntarily dismiss his claim without
prejudice and (2) the defendant's right not to be harassed by repeat
litigation. 23 This Part begins by discussing the purpose and effect of
giving plaintiffs the right to voluntarily dismiss and later refile their

claims. 24 Next, this Part illustrates the ways in which courts and the
Illinois General Assembly have defined the boundaries of this right via
the doctrine of res judicata. 25 Finally, this Part reviews the Illinois court
decisions that established a nexus between the plaintiffs right to refile
voluntarily dismissed litigation and the defendant's right to avoid
26
harassment from duplicative litigation.
A. A Plaintiff's Right to Refile Voluntarily Dismissed Claims
The right of plaintiffs to refile voluntarily dismissed claims is
inherent in the court's ability to grant such dismissals without
prejudice.27 Illinois statute gives plaintiffs the right to voluntarily

21. Other rights protected for litigants include the right to a speedy trial, People v. Collins,
886 N.E.2d 1248, 1251 (I11.App. Ct. 2008), and the right to counsel, In re Barbara H., 702
N.E.2d 555, 561 (I11.1998). Another example of an "absolute right" subject to exception is the
right to appeal from a decision of the trial court. People v. Crane, 743 N.E.2d 555, 564 (I11.
2001).
22. As will be established throughout this Article, "absolute rights" do have necessary
restrictions under statute or when balanced with other rights, and while the term "absolute right"
will be used, it does not imply that there are no restrictions on these rights. See Octavio L. M.
Ferraz, Poverty and Human Rights, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 591 (2008) (asserting that,
while there may not be any "absolute rights," there are "claims of an especially strong
character"). But see Alan Gewirth, Are There Any Absolute Rights?, 31 PHIL.

Q.

1, 1-16 (1981)

(arguing that certain "claim-rights" may be absolute).
23. See infra Part I.A- B (discussing the right to voluntarily dismiss a claim and the doctrine
of res judicata).
24. See infra Part I.A (discussing the development and purpose of the right to voluntarily
dismiss a party's own claims and to refile those claims within one year).
25. See infra Part 11.B (discussing the limiting function of res judicata and the rule against
claim splitting).
26. See infra Part Il.C (discussing Rein v. DavidA. Noyes & Co. and Piagentiniv. FordMotor

Co. and their disparate effect on motion practice).
27. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1009 (2006) ("[A] plaintiff may... dismiss his or her
action or any part thereof ... without prejudice."); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 502 (8th ed.
2004) (defining "dismissed without prejudice" as "removed from the court's docket in such a way
that the plaintiff may refile the same suit on the same claim"). This definition of "without
prejudice" is further bolstered by the statutory enactment of a plaintiff's fight to refile a
voluntarily dismissed claim in section 13-217 of the Illinois Code, discussed in detail later in this
section. See infra note 31 et seq. and accompanying text (describing 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13217).
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dismiss a claim without prejudice at any time before trial. 28 Plaintiffs
are entitled to an automatic voluntary dismissal without prejudice if: (1)
the plaintiff has provided notice to the opposing party; (2) all costs by
all parties have been paid; (3) a trial or hearing has not begun; and (4)
no dispositive motions have been filed.2 9 When these requirements are
met, Illinois courts consistently recognize plaintiffs' right to voluntarily
30
dismiss a claim without prejudice.
Once a court permits voluntary dismissals under section 2-1009 of
the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff has one year to refile
the claim under section 13-217 of the Code. 3 1 Section 13-217's purpose
is to permit plaintiffs to maintain their claim until it is adjudicated on
the merits. 3 2 Many Illinois courts have held that the right to refile a
33
voluntarily dismissed claim under section 13-217 is absolute.
28. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1009(a) ("[T]he plaintiff may, at any time before trial or
hearing begins, upon notice to each party who has appeared, or each party's attorney, upon
payment of costs, dismiss his or her action or any part thereof as to any defendant, without
prejudice by order filed in the cause."). Under federal law, this right is further limited in time.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a) ("[A plaintiff] may dismiss an action without a court order by
filing... a notice of dismissal [and] the dismissal is without prejudice.").
29. See May, supra note 6, at 484 (prescribing these four requirements for obtaining a
voluntary dismissal, after which a plaintiffs right to be granted the dismissal from the court is
generally automatic).
30. See Smith v. Bartley, 847 N.E.2d 642, 644 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (holding that the right to a
voluntary dismissal is almost complete so long as the statutory elements are met); Riblet Prods.
Corp. v. Starr Nat'l, 611 N.E.2d 68, 75 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (upholding the general proposition
that a party has the right to voluntarily dismiss its claims any time before trial begins); Gibellina
v. Handley, 535 N.E.2d 858, 862 (Ill. 1989) (establishing plaintiffs absolute fight to obtain a
voluntary dismissal without prejudice on a claim and detailing different circumstances "ranging
from the potentially abusive to the innocuous" in which plaintiffs may utilize a voluntary
dismissal). But see Flesner v. Youngs Dev. Co., 563 N.E.2d 1097, 1099 (Il. App. Ct. 1990)
(determining that there are a number of situations in which voluntarily dismissed claims are never
refiled).
31. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-217 (2006) ("T]he plaintiff... may commence a new action
within one year or within the remaining period of limitation .... No action which is voluntarily
dismissed by the plaintiff or dismissed for want of prosecution by the court may be filed where
the time commencing the action has expired."); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1009(a). Throughout
the past decade, this section has been closely scrutinized by Illinois courts and the General
Assembly. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the strong inference that the General Assembly
intentionally left section 13-217 unchanged in the most recent tort reform as an indication of its
strong preference for the preservation of the rights surrounding refiling voluntarily dismissed
claims); see also Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1064 (IIl. 1997) (finding P.A.
89-7 unconstitutional, including the abrogation of the one-year limit on refiling voluntarily
dismissed claims); Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem'l Hosp., No. 2006 L 12109, slip op. at 3-4 (Cir. Ct.
Cook County, Nov. 13, 2007) (discussing the 2005 tort reform statutes and P.A. 94-677 which did
not alter section 13-217), cert. granted, Nos. 105741 & 105745.
32. Bryson v. News Am. Publ'ns, Inc., 672 N.E.2d 1207, 1223 (IlI. 1996) (stating that the
purpose of the savings statute is allowing plaintiffs to avoid frustration because of reasons
unrelated to the merits of the claim). But see Mercantile Holdings, Inc. v. Feldman, 630 N.E.2d
965, 968 (Il. App. Ct. 1994) (establishing that, while the right to refile is absolute, it does not
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Nevertheless, the right to refile voluntarily dismissed litigation is
limited by the doctrine of res judicata, which provides that once a court
renders a judgment on the merits of a claim, the judgment remains
final.34 This doctrine ensures that courts and defendants are free from
the harassment of duplicative litigation.35 Res judicata bars the refiling
of a claim when three criteria are met: (1) there is an identity of parties;
(2) there is an identity of a cause of action; and (3) a court of competent
36
jurisdiction has rendered a final judgment on the merits of the claim.
Identity of parties is established through the naming of identical,
adversarial parties in a subsequent action. 37 Identity of cause of action
automatically insulate a plaintiff from certain defenses raised by the defendant). Under federal
law, the notice of dismissal acts as an adjudication on the merits if the plaintiff previously
dismissed any action "based on or including" the same claim. FED. R. CIv. P. 41(a)(1)(B).
33. Flores v. Dugan, 435 N.E.2d 480, 481 (Ill. 1982) (holding that an order dismissing a cause
for want of prosecution is not a final and appealable order given plaintiff's "absolute" right to
refile the same claim against the same party); Wold v. Bull Valley Mgmt. Inc., 449 N.E.2d 112,
113 (Il1. 1983) (upholding the Flores decision in deciding that a plaintiff s absolute right to refile
a cause dismissed for want of prosecution trumps the plaintiffs own desire to appeal the granting
of the order to dismiss); see also Case v. Galesburg Cottage Hosp., 880 N.E.2d 171, 176 (Ill.
2007) (holding that the limitations statute grants a plaintiff the absolute right to refile voluntarily
dismissed complaint). Illinois courts have upheld the statutory limitations to this right, such as
the limitations period of one year and the prevention of more than one refiling of the same
voluntarily dismissed claim. See, e.g., Timberlake v. Illini Hosp., 676 N.E.2d 634, 636 (Ill. 1997)
(barring multiple refilings of the same voluntarily dismissed claim); Ruklick v. Julius Schmid,
Inc., 523 N.E.2d 1208, 1211 (111. App. Ct. 1988) (discussing the possibility of these limitations).
See also 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitations of Actions § 275 (2000) ("A savings statute is designed to
ensure that diligent litigants retain the right to a hearing in court until they receive judgment on
the merits .... ").
34. This concept sometimes leads to "judicial bootstrapping." William Baude, The Judgment
Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807, 1846 (2008) (citing the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111 (1963), as upholding the principle that so long as the issues
presented to the court were "fully and fairly litigated," the final judgment of the court prevents the
re-litigation of the same claims even if the court's determination on jurisdiction was wrong).
35. See Gimbel, supra note 1, at 404 (providing that res judicata refers to two distinct
concepts of "merger," the effect of a judgment combining all of the claims that were raised or
could have been raised into one judgment, and "bar," the accompanying effect of such a judgment
disallowing the plaintiff from litigating any of the claims introduced or that could have been
introduced under the same transaction in the judgment).
36. GEORGE SPENCER BOWER & SIR ALEXANDER KINGCOME TURNER, THE DOCTRINE OF
REs JUDICATA 31 (1969). This Article will only address the first element in detail. The second
two elements are outside the scope of this Article and will only be briefly defined.
37. See Gimbel, supra note 1, at 407 n.49 (citing Nesses v. Shepard, 68 F.3d 1003, 1004 (7th
Cir. 1995) for establishing the fact that res judicata may still bar an action when the plaintiff has
merely added another party to the claim). Illinois courts appear to treat this "personal" res
judicata more leniently than res judicata concerns arising from relitigated claims, which is
somewhat contradictory given the often-stated policy argument that res judicata is intended to
protect defendants and not explicitly to protect claims. See, e.g., Hendricks v. Victory Mem'l
Hosp., 755 N.E.2d 1013, 1015-16 (Il. App. Ct. 2001) (holding that a third malpractice complaint
arising out of the same transaction and set of operable facts and which were voluntarily dismissed
by the plaintiff could be refiled because the hospital defendant was a new party and had not been
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38
exists when two claims arise from a single group of operative facts.
Finally, res judicata requires that a court of competent jurisdiction has
previously rendered a final appealable order on the merits of a prior
claim. 39 Usually, this final, appealable order refers to an involuntary
dismissal with prejudice, which is a decision "concerning the rights and

liabilities of the parties based on ultimate facts . ..and on which the

right of recovery depends." 40 Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 273,
any such decision constitutes a final judgment on the merits, and res
judicata bars plaintiffs from
bringing the same claim against the same
41
defendant in the future.
Voluntary dismissals are typically rendered without prejudice and,
therefore, claims can be refiled. 4 2

However, plaintiffs taking a

named in the first complaint); Mozer v. Kerth, 586 N.E.2d 759, 768 (1I1. App. Ct. 1992)
(determining that a plaintiff may refile a claim against a voluntarily dismissed defendant even if
other defendants did not remain in the action).
38. Gimbel, supra note 1,at 408. Illinois state courts have evaluated the second element of
res judicata, the identity of the cause of action, under two different tests: the "same evidence test"
and the "transactional test." Id. Two claims would be considered the same action under the same
evidence test either if the same facts were necessary for maintaining both actions or if the
evidence needed to sustain the first claim was also necessary for the second claim. Id. The
transactional test requires that either both claims or both pleaded theories of relief arise under the
same group of operative facts, not simply the facts which support the judgment in the first action.
Id. The Illinois Supreme Court has held that, while the result of both tests tended to render the
same result, the transactional test provides for more consistent decisions within Illinois as well as
in other jurisdictions. River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 703 N.E.2d 883, 893 (Ill. 1998).
39. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1336-37 (8th ed. 2004) (defining res judicata as requiring
a "final judgment on the merits"); Downing v. Chi. Transit Auth., 642 N.E.2d 456, 460 (Ill. 1994)
(determining that the summary judgment entered against plaintiffs on the basis that the statute of
limitations had run was not a final judgment on the merits (citing People ex rel. Burris v.
Progressive Land Developers, Inc., 602 N.E.2d 820, 825 (111.1992))).
40. See Gimbel, supra note 1, at 405 (citing A.W. Wendell & Sons, Inc. v. Qazi, 626 N.E.2d
280, 289 (I11.
App. Ct. 1993)); see also ILL. SUP. CT. R. 273 (describing an involuntary dismissal
of an action, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to
join an indispensable party, as an adjudication on the merits); People ex rel. McAllister v. East,
100 N.E.2d 746, 748 (i1. 1951) ("[Hlowever erroneous the decision, it is binding [and]
conclusive as to the rights of the parties.").
41. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 273 ("Unless the order of dismissal or a statute of this State otherwise
specifies, an involuntary dismissal of an action, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for
improper venue, or for failure to join an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the
merits."). This rule also applies to the involuntary dismissal of any part of the litigated case such
as a counterclaim or partial claim. Richard Black & Theresa A. Phelps, Survey of Illinois Law:
Civil Procedure, 25 S.ILL. U. L.J. 697,721-22 (2001).
42. See infra Part IHA (discussing the effect of voluntary dismissals and refiling voluntarily
dismissed claims); see also In re Custody of D.A., 558 N.E.2d 1355, 1358 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990)
(holding that voluntary dismissal was not a final order requiring appeal); Arnold Schaffner, Inc.
v. Goodman, 392 N.E.2d 375, 377 (i1. App. Ct. 1979) (dismissal "without prejudice" does not
terminate litigation and, therefore, was not final and appealable); ITOFCA, Inc. v. Megatrans
Logistics, Inc., 235 F.3d 360, 365 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that a "dismissal without prejudice
would be insufficient to create a final judgment").
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voluntary dismissal do not automatically immunize themselves from the
doctrine of res judicata. 4 3 Nevertheless, voluntary dismissals are
generally not final, appealable judgments except in unusual
circumstances involving the interest of substantial justice or the
44
pendency of other court orders.
B. Claim Splitting: Res Judicata Within a Single Action
Related to the concept of res judicata is the concept of claim
preclusion and the conflict arising from a plaintiff separating his claims
among multiple modes of litigation. 4 5 A claim may not be adjudicated
separately from other claims when it arises from the same transaction or
series of transactions. 4 6 The rule prohibiting plaintiffs from splitting
43. Zuniga v. Dwyer, 752 N.E.2d 491, 495 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (determining that the code
provision allowing plaintiffs to voluntarily dismiss claims without prejudice does not
automatically immunize a plaintiff against the bar of res judicata or any other legitimate defenses
a defendant may assert in response to the refiling of voluntarily dismissed counts).
44. See In re Marriage of Barmak, 657 N.E.2d 730, 732 (111.App. Ct. 1995) (holding that a
voluntary dismissal without prejudice of a petition for prospective attorney fees was a final
judgment and triggered the 30-day period for respondent to file for sanctions); Espedido v. St.
Joseph Hosp., 526 N.E.2d 664, 669 (11. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that the appellate court had
jurisdiction to consider the merits of an appeal from a voluntary dismissal in the interests of
substantial justice); City of Palos Heights v. Vill. of Worth, 331 N.E.2d 190, 194 (Il1. App. Ct.
1975) (holding that an order granting plaintiff's motion for a voluntary dismissal was final and
appealable due to another pending order). In federal law, this concept is stipulated within Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(l)(B). FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(l)(B) ("[Voluntary] dismissal is
without prejudice.... But if the plaintiff previously dismissed any federal-or state-court
action based on or including the same claim, a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication on
the merits."). Federal courts have consistently held that voluntary dismissals, even when
disposing of the entire action and proceeding summary judgment, do not have a res judicata
effect. Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1161 (11 th Cir. 2003) (determining that the claim was not
barred by res judicata because the earlier case was dismissed without prejudice and thus the
merits were not adjudicated); Amadeo v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 290 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th
Cir. 2002) (holding that a voluntary dismissal does not have any res judicata effect even if
asummary judgment has been entered in another part of the action).
45. The United States Supreme Court accepted this principle in Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979).
Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action
Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 732 (2005). See also Ziff, supra note 2, at 905 (discussing
the principle that parties may litigate new claims arising from the same transaction as previous
litigation if the law governing their facts were recast in such a way that would not have been
reasonably anticipated). For example, assume a bank sues one party in bankruptcy court alleging
that money is owed on an account and then sues another party in state court regarding the same
account on the same debt; the bank has engaged in impermissible claim splitting under the
doctrine of res judicata. Smith Trust & Say. Bank v. Young, 727 N.E.2d 1042, 1045 (IIl. App. Ct.

2000).
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(l) (1982). A "transaction" under this
section is defined "pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are
related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and
whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding
or usage." Id. § 24(2).
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their claims into multiple proceedings is grounded in Illinois
precedent. 47 This rule promotes the preference for finality and
efficiency in the legal system. 48 It also prohibits a party from appealing
a final judgment on one claim while a related claim is still pending at
the trial court level. 49 However, an exception is triggered when the
appeal would have the tri-partite effect of expediting the resolution of
the controversy, establishing fairness, and conserving judicial
50
resources.
Illinois courts have held that plaintiffs who split a claim are barred
from refiling the entire action at a later time. 5 1 Accordingly, plaintiffs
52
may not split different theories of relief that relate to one transaction.
The presence of a small variation in the facts is insufficient to negate
this requirement.5 3 In fact, even if a plaintiff is able to present new
47. Casselberry v. Forquer, 27 I11.170, 170 (1862) (determining that a plaintiff cannot split a
single and entire cause of action); Matthias v. Cook, 31 I11.83, 86 (I1. 1863) (holding that a cause
of action cannot be split by discontinuing a part of the action); Radosta v. Chrysler Corp., 443
N.E.2d 670, 672 (I1. App. Ct. 1982). Federal courts also strongly adhere to the rule against claim
splitting as a means of barring claims already determined by or concurrently filed in another
court. See Wolff, supra note 45, at 752 (citing United States Supreme Court decisions relying on
the same provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments relied upon in Illinois state courts'
decisions).
48. See Ziff, supra note 2, at 910 (stating that judicial efficiency is one of the goals of the
doctrine of claim preclusion); see also Mares v. Metzler, 409 N.E.2d 447, 450 (I11.App. Ct. 1980)
(determining that the purpose of the rule against claim splitting enforces the dual concern of
judicial efficiency and certainty-a problem that is especially difficult when a final judgment is
entered on less than all claims in the action).
49. See Rebecca A. Cochran, Gaining Appellate Review by "Manufacturing" a Final
Judgment Through a Voluntary Dismissal of PeripheralClaims, 48 MERCER L. REV. 979, 98286 (1997) (analyzing the growing use of voluntary dismissals to attempt circumvent this
restriction).
50. Matson v. Dept. of Human Rights, 750 N.E.2d 1273, 1278 (111.App. Ct. 2001) (discussing
the purpose of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) in preventing piecemeal appeal in most
situations as including all three concerns); Schal Bovis, Inc. v. Cas. Ins. Co., 732 N.E.2d 1082,
1089 (I11.App. Ct. 1999) (leaving Rule 304(a) determinations in the sound discretion of the court
along with the determination of whether an immediate appeal would be beneficial under the
particular circumstances presented in the case to determine the best balance among these
interests); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 304(a) ("[In a multi-claim suit,] an appeal may be taken from a final
judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the parties or claims only if the trial court has
made an express written finding that there is no just reason for delaying either enforcement or
appeal or both.").
51. See May, supra note 6, at 489 (stating that Illinois denies parties from dismissing and later
refiling causes of action that are mandatorily joined to another, such as loss of consortium claims
in divorce proceedings, which would lead to problematic double recovery (citing Zuniga v.
Dwyer, 752 N.E.2d 491,495 (Il. App. Ct. 2001))).
52. Peregrine Fin. Group, Inc. v. Ambuehl, 722 N.E.2d 723, 729 (I11.App. Ct. 1999); see also
Ziff, supra note 2, at 918 (providing that a judgment is conclusive for the purposes of claim
splitting even if "perfect defenses" to the litigation were later found (citing Cromwell v. County
of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1877))).
53. Agriserve, Inc. v. Belden, 643 N.E.2d 1193, 1195 (I11.App. Ct. 1994). See also Schnitzer
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evidence, theories, or remedies in the subsequent case, the rule against
claim splitting will likely apply if the cause of action arises out of the
54
same transaction.
Even though this rule bars most subsequent claims, there are narrow
exceptions permitting a plaintiff to assert certain claims that could have
been litigated in a prior suit. 55 Illinois courts recognize six exceptions,
or permissible forms of claim splitting, drawn from the Second
Restatement of Judgments, such as when the court expressly reserves
the plaintiffs right to maintain a second action or when the defendant
acquiesces to the second action. 56 Additionally, some courts recognize
a seventh possible exception which prevents the application of res
judicata where fundamental fairness so requires. 57 This broad concept
v. O'Connor, 653 N.E.2d 825, 832-33 (111.App. Ct. 1995) (determining that a plaintiffs new
allegations asserting that her former employer's board was unresponsive to her demands were
merely technical requirements that did not change the transaction under which both sets of
allegations were filed). The test for whether a claim may be adjudicated separately from other
claims is if it does not arise from the same transaction or series of transactions. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(2) (1982) ("[A] transaction [under this section is defined]
pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space,
origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a
unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding or usage.").
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25 (1982) (providing that section 24 of the
Restatement applies to a plaintiff's claim "even though the plaintiff is prepared in the second
action (1) [t]o present evidence or grounds or theories of the case not presented in the first action,
or (2) [t]o seek remedies or forms of relief not demanded in the first action"); see also Baker v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 223 (1998) ("[There is] no reason why the preclusive effects of
an adjudication on parties and those 'in privity' with them... should differ depending solely
upon the type of relief sought in a civil action."). The purpose of this principle is to promote the
interest of judicial economy and should, therefore, be construed liberally. See Schnitzer v.
O'Connor, 653 N.E.2d 825, 832 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (determining that extraneous theories of
relief and evidence on a second count were "merely technical requirements to sustain the
plaintiff's first count" and, therefore, did not affect the application of res judicata).
55. See infra Part ll.C (discussing the exceptions to the rule against claim splitting).
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(l)(a)-(f) (1982); see Robinson v. Toyota
Motor Credit Corp., 775 N.E.2d 951, 958 (Ill. 2002) (finding that, by holding that a federal
judgment did not preclude plaintiff's claim, the court expressly reserved the claim for later
adjudication). Another way to insulate a claim for refiling is through Illinois Supreme Court Rule
304(a), which provides that "an appeal may be taken from a final judgment as to one or more but
fewer than all ... claims only if the trial court has made an express written finding that there is no
just reason for delaying either enforcement or appeal or both." ILL. SUP. CT. R. 304(a). This rule
also prescribes that "any judgment that adjudicates fewer than all the claims ... is not enforceable
or appealable and is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all
the claims ... of all the parties." Id.
57. See Ziff, supra note 2, at 925 (discussing the necessity of creating flexible exceptions to
the rule against claim splitting "in the name of justice and fair play"); Weisman v. Schiller,
Ducanto & Fleck, 733 N.E.2d 818, 822 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (stating that the doctrine of res
judicata need not be applied where fundamental fairness so requires (citing People v. Somerville,
245 N.E.2d 461, 463-64 (1969))); see also Best Coin-Op, Inc. v. Paul F. hlg Supply Co., Inc., 545
N.E.2d 481, 495 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that, under the particular facts of the case, the rule
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relaxes the rule against claim splitting in cases where there is an
mistake, fraud, or inequity. 58

omission by the plaintiff due to ignorance,
As the next section will explore,
Illinois courts have applied these
59
exceptions in a variety of ways.

C. The Illinois Courts' Indecision on Refiling PartialClaims After
Voluntary Dismissal
Illinois courts have addressed the intersection between res judicata

and voluntary dismissal in disparate ways. 60 On the one hand, in Rein
v. David A. Noyes & Co., the Illinois Supreme Court declared that res
judicata barred refiling a voluntarily dismissed claim, whereas in
Piagentini v. Ford Motor Co., an Illinois appellate court declined to

apply Rein, holding that
a refiled voluntarily dismissed claim was not
61
judicata.
res
by
barred
1. Rein v. DavidA. Noyes & Co.: Prohibiting Refiling
In Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., the Illinois Supreme Court held that
a refiled voluntarily dismissed claim was barred under the doctrine of

res judicata. 62 In October 1990, the Reins filed suit against a securities
dealer seeking to rescind purchases and recover damages under
common law fraud (Rein I). However, because the statute of limitations
had run, the trial court dismissed the rescission claims. 6 3 The court also

denied the plaintiffs request for a partial appeal under Illinois Supreme
against claim splitting ought to be relaxed).
58. Best Coin, 545 N.E.2d at 495 (citing Thorleif Larsen & Son v. PPG Indus., Inc., 532
N.E.2d 423, 427 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)). See also Joel deJesus, Interagency Privity and Claim
Preclusion, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 195, 198 (1990) (discussing the four traditional goals of res
judicata: "finality, consistency, judicial economy, and fairness" (citing Brown v. Felson, 442 U.S.
127, 131 (1979))).
59. See infra Part U.C (discussing two different cases dealing with voluntary dismissals and
the doctrine of res judicata: Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 665 N.E.2d 1199 (Ill. 1996) and
Piagentini v. Ford Motor Co., 852 N.E.2d 356 (I11.App. Ct. 2006), vacated, 886 N.E.2d 1025 (I11.
2008), revised, 2009 WL 113459 (11. App. Ct. Jan. 15, 2009).
60. See Rein, 665 N.E.2d at 1206 (finding that a refiled voluntarily dismissed claim is barred
when an involuntary order has been issued on another claim within the action in a previous
judgment). But see Piagentini, 852 N.E.2d at 362 (finding that a refiled voluntarily dismissed
claim fails under the second exception to the rule against claim splitting).
61. See infra Part II.C.1-2 (discussing these two cases at greater length and their application
of the previously discussed concepts of voluntary dismissals and res judicata).
62. Rein, 665 N.E.2d at 1204 (holding that res judicata bars the refiling of a voluntarily
dismissed claim if a final judgment has been rendered on any part of the cause of action).
63. Rein, 665 N.E.2d at 1202. See also 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13(d) (1989) (current version
at 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13(d) (2006) (providing in relevant part that "no action shall be
brought for relief ... 3 years from the date of sale")). Therefore, the dismissal under section 2619(a)(5) for not commencing an action "within the time limited by law" was appropriately
granted. Rein, 665 N.E.2d at 1202 (citing 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-619(c)).
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Court Rule 304(a). 64 In August 1991, the plaintiffs voluntarily
dismissed their remaining common law claims and then appealed the
65
dismissal of the rescission counts.
Two years later, after losing their appeal, the Reins refiled the case
against the same securities dealer. 66 In Rein II, they added an equitable
estoppel defense to the rescission counts, both of which had been
previously denied on appeal.67 The plaintiffs also asserted the common
68
law fraud claims they had voluntarily dismissed in the previous suit.
The trial court dismissed the case under the doctrine of res judicata, a
decision which was affirmed on appeal.6 9
The Illinois Supreme Court, affirmed dismissal of the refiled claims
under res judicata and the rule against claim splitting. 70 First, the court
held that the voluntary dismissal statutes, while prescribing the right of
plaintiffs to dismiss and refile claims, do not automatically immunize
plaintiffs from the bar of res judicata. 7 1 The court determined that res
64. Id. (determining that there was no just reason to delay the enforcement of the judgment
dismissing the rescission claims). Rule 304(a) prescribes that "an appeal may be taken from a
final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the parties or claims only if the trial court
has made an express written finding that there is no just reason for delaying either enforcement or
appeal or both." ILL. SUP. CT. R. 304(a). A finding made by the court under this rule "may be
made at the time of the entry of the judgment or thereafter on the court's own motion or on
motion of any party." Id.
65. Rein, 665 N.E.2d at 1203-04 (discussing the appellate court's decision to uphold the
involuntary dismissal).
66. Id. at 1203 (citing Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 595 N.E.2d 565, 568 (11. App. Ct.
1992) (holding that the plaintiffs complaint was not timely filed within the three year
requirement under section 2-619(a)(5) and that plaintiff's argument that the present statute of
limitations allows filing within five years of the alleged fraudulent sales is without merit)).
67
Id. at 1202 (stating that Rein II was "virtually identical" to the complaint filed and
dismissed in Rein 1).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1203. The majority of the appellate court discussed the application of res judicata to
the motion practice of the plaintiffs' attorneys in much the same way as the Illinois Supreme
Court would. See infra note 72 and accompanying text. However, the dissenting opinion, written
by Justice Rathje, argues that because section 2-1009 allows for voluntary dismissals of partial
claims without prejudice, the exception to the rule against claim splitting that allows for split
claims "where it would be inequitable to apply the rule" applies. Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co.,
649 N.E.2d 64, 70 (111.App. Ct. 1995) (Rathje, J., dissenting) (citing Thorleif Larsen & Son, Inc.
v. PPG Indus., Inc., 532 N.E.2d 423, 427 (I11.App. Ct. 1988)). The dissent also argued that the
exception to the rule against claim splitting that allows for the court to reserve the plaintiffs right
to maintain the second action could apply under the Restatement (Second) of Judgments
section 26(b) because the trial court is, in essence, preserving the voluntarily dismissed claim for
at least one year under section 13-217. Id. To not apply these exceptions, the court proposed a
"cure [that] is more harmful than the disease itself." Id. at 71.
70. Rein, 665 N.E.2d at 1202.
71. Id. See May, supra note 6, at 489 (citing both Rein and Zuniga v. Dwyer, 752 N.E.2d 491,
495 (I11.App. Ct. 2001) as basis for the supposition that a voluntary dismissal does not create
immunity from a res judicata defense).
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judicata prohibited not only the issues actually raised in Rein I, but also
any issue that could have been raised.7 2 Therefore, the involuntary
dismissal and subsequent appeal of the rescission claim in Rein I barred
any subsequent7 3actions between the same parties involving the same
cause of action.
In addition, the court found that because the plaintiffs had only one
suit against the defendants, their voluntary dismissal of the common law
counts impermissibly split their cause of action. 74 The court determined
that allowing the plaintiffs to refile the case would impair judicial
75
economy and undermine the public policy underlying res judicata.
The court also asserted that if plaintiffs were allowed to use voluntary
dismissal to circumvent a court's order denying partial appeal under
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a),7 6the court's discretion to permit
partial appeals would be emasculated.

72. Rein, 665 N.E.2d at 1204 (determining that while a single cause of action may give rights
to a number of different theories of recovery, there still only remains one action and all issues that
could be raised under this action should be raised, concurrently (citing People ex rel. Burris v.
Progressive Land Developers, Inc., 602 N.E.2d 820, 825 (iIl. 1992))). See also Thorleif Larsen &
Son, Inc., 532 N.E.2d at 425 (defining res judicata as precluding "not only every matter which
was offered to sustain or defeat the claim or demand made in the prior action, but also any other
matter which might have been offered for that purpose") (citation omitted).
73. Rein, 665 N.E.2d at 1205. "[R]esjudicata is broader than plaintiffs suggest" in that if the
three elements of res judicata are met (final judgment, identity of parties, and identity of cause of
action), every matter that could have been litigated in the first action will be barred in a second
action. Id. Therefore, the final judgment on the rescission claims bars the common law claims
involving the same transaction and the same parties even though there was not a specific final
judgment on those claims. Id.
74. Id. The court suggested that, following the involuntary dismissal of the rescission counts,
the plaintiffs should have proceeded with the litigation of the common law counts until a decision
was reached. Id. at 1208. If the judgment was not favorable, the plaintiffs could have then
appealed both the judgment on their common law counts as well as the involuntary dismissal on
their rescission counts. Id. Even if the plaintiffs had appealed both the involuntary dismissal on
the rescission claims and the voluntary dismissal on the common law claims, they would have
avoided impermissibly splitting their claims. See Cochran, supra note 49, at 982 (discussing that,
while voluntary dismissals are usually not appealable, they may be used to manufacture a final
judgment, which will allow the entire action to be appealable following a voluntary dismissal).
75. Rein, 665 N.E.2d at 1208. The court was specifically trying to prevent situations where a
plaintiff would be permitted to file a multi-claim litigation, voluntarily dismiss some but not all of
the claims, obtain a final judgment on the undismissed claims, and if unsuccessful on the claims
not dismissed, refile the previously dismissed claims. Id.
76. Id. The three concerns arising from this scenario--l) impairing judicial economy, (2)
protecting defendants from harassment and the public from multiple litigation, and (3)
emasculating Rule 304(a) by "allowing a plaintiff to circumvent a trial judge's denial of a Rule
304(a) certification by refiling previously dismissed counts following an unsuccessful judgment
or appeal"-are referred to consistently as the policy decisions underpinning the analysis of Rein.
Id. See Piagentini v. Ford Motor Co., 852 N.E.2d 357, 361 (il. App. Ct. 2006), vacated, 866
N.E.2d 1025 (Ill. 2008), revised, 2009 WL 113459 (il. App. Ct. Jan. 15, 2009) (holding that the
trial court's order was not a final order in light of the Illinois Supreme Court's holding in Hudson
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2. Piagentiniv. Ford Motor Co.: Refiling Allowed
Rein's broad application of res judicata to voluntary dismissals,
however, has not been universally applied. In Piagentiniv. Ford Motor
Co., the Illinois Appellate Court distinguished Rein and instead limited
the decision to instances where plaintiffs continued litigating their
involuntarily dismissed claim after voluntarily dismissing the remainder

of their case, 77 In Piagentini, the trial court granted the defendant's
partial summary judgment and
allowed the plaintiffs to voluntarily
78

dismiss their remaining claims.

Unlike in Rein, however, the plaintiffs did not seek a Rule 304(a)
determination from the court that would allow them to appeal their
79
partial claim, nor did they appeal the summary judgment order.
Within one year of the voluntary dismissal, the plaintiffs refiled their

complaint, and, three years later, 80 the defendants filed a motion for

v. City of Chicago); Hudson v. City of Chicago, 889 N.E.2d 210, 217 (Ill. 2008) (reaffirming the
same concerns posed in Rein).
77. Piagentini,852 N.E.2d at 362. This "crucial distinction" highlights the fact that Ford was
in no different position than any other defendant who is party to an action that is voluntarily
dismissed and later refiled because the plaintiffs in Piagentini did not have any other claims
pending or litigated in any other court, but were merely waiting to refile their voluntarily
dismissed claim. Id. The plaintiffs repeat the "critical" nature of this distinction later as well. Id.
78. Id. at 358. The court granted the partial summary judgment on account of the plaintiffs
failure to disclose any expert witness to testify on the insufficient stability or susceptibility to rollovers, which left the inadequate occupant protection claim for consideration. Id; see Thomas R.
Malia, Annotation, Products Liability:Admissibility of Defendant's Evidence of Industry Custom
or Practice in Strict Liability Action, 47 A.L.R. 621, § 2(b) (1986) (discussing the proper
foundation needed to introduce evidence related to industry standards). The plaintiffs filed their
motion for voluntary dismissal under section 2-1009. Piagentini,852 N.E.2d at 359; see 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/2-1009 (1994) (current version in 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1009 (2006)
(providing that voluntary dismissal is without prejudice as long as it is refiled within one year
under section 13-217).
79. Piagentini, 852 N.E.2d at 359 (discussing the factual background and filing procedure of
the parties, which did not include an attempted appeal or a circumvented Rule 304(a) finding).
Courts may, under Rule 304(a), allow an appeal of a partial claim when the appeal would
expedite the resolution of the controversy, would be fair to the parties, and would conserve
judicial resources. See Matson v. Dept. of Human Rights, 750 N.E.2d 1273, 1278 (I11.App. Ct.
2001) (stating that the decision to grant Rule 304(a) relief is a matter within the sound discretion
of the court).
80. The court also discussed the defendant's potential waiver of its res judicata defense by
waiting three and half years before raising the argument, subsequently determining it was
inequitable to allow the successful raising of the res judicata defense under these circumstances.
Piagentini, 852 N.E.2d at 363 ("[I]t would hardly be 'equitable' to allow Ford to successfully
raise res judicata after the parties ... spent money on experts, discovery, and all of the other costs
associated with bringing a lawsuit."). The court also determined that the defendants could not
claim to be unjustly burdened by the refiled litigation three and a half years after notice of
refiling. Id.
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summary judgment under the doctrine of res judicata. 8 1 The trial court
granted the defendant's motion, and the plaintiffs appealed.8 2
The appellate court overruled the trial court's order for summary
judgment. 83 The court reasoned that none of the policy concerns
enumerated in Rein II were applicable; the plaintiffs did not attempt to

circumvent a Rule 304(a) finding, and did not continue litigating one

claim while preserving others through a voluntary dismissal.8 4 The
court ultimately determined that Rein II only barred piecemeal
litigation, including partial appeals, which was not at issue in
Piagentini.85
These two cases highlight the courts' disparate application of res
86
judicata to the practice of refiling prior voluntarily dismissed claims.
Two years after the appellate court decided Piagentini, however, the
any confusion surrounding this issue
Illinois Supreme Court eradicated
87
in Hudson v. City of Chicago.
81. Id. at 362. Res judicata, as a defense used to dispose of cases already litigated, ought to be
timely filed because of one of the basic principles of the defense itself: economy of court time.
See Les Mendelsohn, Election of Remedies and Settlement-New Lyrics to an Outworn Tune, 12
ST. MARY'S L.J. 367, 372 (1980) (providing four such basic principles of res judicata as being
free from vexatious litigation, the danger of double recovery, desirability of stable decisions, and
economy of court time); William E. Mooney, Sr., The Doctrine of Preclusion in Negligence
Cases, 1968 INS. L.J. 747, 747 (1968) (discussing the basic principles of res judicata in the
context of tort claims).
82. Piagentini,852 N.E.2d at 362.
83. Id. at 358.
84. Id. at 361-62. The appellate court determined that Rein only applied to these situations
where a plaintiff had attempted to preserve its own claims through a voluntary dismissal after a
court refused to do so in order that another claim could be litigated through the appeals process.
Id. at 359-60 (citing Best Coin-Op, Inc. v. Paul F. Ilg Supply Co., 545 N.E.2d 481, 489 (I11.
1989) for its discussion on the rule against claim splitting where an action is, by nature,
indivisible, and may not be divided into separate lawsuits as well as the inequitable technical
application of res judicata). The court made it clear that res judicata should not be used as a
"sword by a defendant . . . [to] avoid[] litigation." Id. at 362. Coupling these two definite
statements by the appellate court, it is apparent that Piagentiniwas intended to be the foil factual
scenario to the situation and the Illinois Supreme Court's analysis in Rein. Id.
85. Id. The concept of res judicata preventing piecemeal litigation is well-documented and is,
in fact, the purpose behind the rule against claim splitting. See Andrew S. Weinstein, Avoiding
the Race to Res Judicata:FederalAntisuit Injunctions of Competing State Actions, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1085, 1117 (2000) (discussing the importance of avoiding piecemeal litigation); Dubina v.
Mesirow Realty Dev., Inc., 687 N.E.2d 871, 876-77 (111.1997) ("[A] plaintiff seeking to split his
claims and appeal in a piecemeal manner may be barred by resjudicata.").
86. See Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 665 N.E.2d 1199 (I11. 1996) (finding that a refiled
voluntarily dismissed claim is barred when an involuntary order has been issued on another claim
within the action in a previous judgment). But see Piagentini,852 N.E.2d at 356 (finding that a
refiled voluntarily dismissed claim falls under the second exception to the rule against claim
splitting when the court expressly reserves the claim for later adjudication).
87. See infra Part Im (discussing Hudson v. City of Chicago, 889 N.E.2d 210 (I1. 2008), at
length, including the factual background as well as the decisions of the appellate court and the
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III. DISCUSSION
Through its decision in Hudson, the Illinois Supreme Court elevated
the general duty of the courts to regulate the judicial system over the
88
duty to protect individual litigants' right to adjudicate their claims.
This Part begins by describing the facts underlying Hudson as well as
the decisions at the trial and appellate court levels. 89 It then90discusses
the Illinois Supreme Court's majority and dissenting opinions.
A. FactualBackground: The Tale of Two Dismissals
At approximately 4:00 p.m. on November 25, 1998, five-year old
George Hudson had an acute asthma attack. 9 1 Ednarine Hudson,
George's mother, called 911 to request emergency assistance. 9 2 The
service dispatched a fire engine to the Hudson home, but the vehicle
was not equipped with advanced life-support (ALS). 93 Upon arriving,
the firemen called for a vehicle equipped with ALS. 94 The ambulance
arrived fifteen minutes after Ednarine Hudson's original 911 call, but
George had already died. 95
On March 30, 1999, Ednarine and George Hudson, Sr., filed a twocount wrongful death complaint against the City of Chicago, claiming
Illinois Supreme Court).
88. See Pfaff v. Chrysler Corp., 610 N.E.2d 51, 76 (I1. 1992) (Heiple, J., dissenting) ("The
idea that there should be two simultaneous actions pending, both taking up already choked
dockets, where one would be resjudicatato the other, is almost unjustifiable.").
89. See infra Part m.A-B (discussing the facts and procedural history of Hudson).
90. See infra Part m.C.I (discussing the majority and dissenting opionions).
91. Plaintiff's Petition for Leave to Appeal at 4, Hudson, 889 N.E.2d 210 (No. 100466).
92. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 212. In their refiled complaint, the plaintiffs also alleged that the
city was aware of George Hudson's asthmatic condition prior to this emergency phone call.
Plaintiff's Petition for Leave to Appeal, supra note 91, at 4.
93. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 212. Dispatchers generally send ALS engines to respond to any
911 medical emergency. See Stephanie Banchero & William Recktenwald, City's Response to
Emergencies in Critical State: Fire Department's Outdated System Is Putting Lives at Risk,
Experts Say, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 21, 1997, at Cl (discussing how the city operates with an outdated

emergency medical system as compared to other cities across the nation).
94. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 212. Because of the need for ALS, Chicago proposed a plan in
1997 where 24 engine companies would carry ALS and would receive the majority of emergency
calls. STEVE MACKO, EMERGENCY RESPONSE & RESEARCH INST., CHICAGO TO IMPLEMENT
PARAMEDIC-ENGINE COMPANIES 193 (1997), available at http://www.emergency.com/
chigpara.htm (detailing the proposed plan). In 1997, Chicago released four engines equipped
with ALS to add to the more than fifty-six already operating in the city. See Editorial, Help in
Emergencies, CHI. SUN TIMES, Nov. 4, 1997, at 29 (discussing the implementation of the ALS
plan).
95. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 212. The average response time throughout Chicago in 1990 was
four minutes and fifteen seconds according to Fire Department Spokesman Jerry Lawrence.
David C. Rudd, City Adds Two New Ambulances to Help Response Times, CHI. TRIB., May 9,
1990, at C7.
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that George died as a result of the city's negligent delay as well as the
city's willful and wanton conduct in providing ALS. 96 The circuit court
granted the city's motion to dismiss the negligence claim because of its
immunity under the EMS Act. 97 The plaintiffs, however, continued to
litigate the willful and wanton conduct claim. 9 8 On July 25, 2002, the
plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the willful and wanton claim because
they were unable to prepare for trial following the unexpected death of
99
their lead attorney.
The plaintiffs then refiled the willful and wanton claim one year later
as Hudson H.100 The city moved to dismiss, arguing that Hudson H

violated the principle of res judicata because an involuntary dismissal of
the negligence claim had already been granted in Hudson 1.101

96.
97.

The

Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 212.
Id. See also EMS Act, 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/3.150(b)-(c) (2006) (providing in

relevant part that a governmental organization shall not be liable for any civil damages for any act
or omission in connection with emergency services unless the act or omission was the result of
willful and wanton misconduct and that this exemption from civil liability for emergency care
was provided by the Good Samaritan Act under 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 49/1 et seq. (2006)). The
defendant's filed the motion to dismiss pursuant to 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-619(a)(2). See 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-619(a)(2) (2006) (stating in relevant part that the "defendant may, within
the time for pleading, file a motion for dismissal of the action ...[if the] defendant does not have
legal capacity to be sued ).
dissenting).
98. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 230 (Kilbride, J.,
99. Id. See generally 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1009(a) (2006) ("[A] plaintiff may, at any
time before trial begins ... dismiss his action or any part thereof as to any defendant, without
prejudice."). The plaintiffs filed for a motion to voluntarily dismiss their willful and wanton
conduct claim after the attorney on the case was unable to adequately prepare for trial because of
the unexpected death of the lead attorney on the case. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 230.
100. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 212 (majority opinion); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-217 (2006)
(providing in relevant part that the plaintiff may refile a voluntarily dismissed claim within one
year of the dismissal). See O'Casek v. Children's Home & Aid Soc. of Ill., 874 N.E.2d 150, 152App. Ct. 2007) (finding section 13-217 unconstitutional for issues unrelated to refiling
53. (I11.
voluntarily dismissed claims), rev'd on unrelated grounds sub nom. Crull v. Sritana, 878 N.E.2d
753 (I11.
App. Ct. 2007).
101. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 213; 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-619(a)(4) (2006) (providing in
relevant part that "the action is barred by a prior judgment"); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 273 ("[A]n
involuntary dismissal of an action, other than for a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper
venue, or for failure to join an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.").
While the involuntary dismissal on account of the city's immunity was a final, appealable order,
it was arguably not an adjudication on the merits because the Supreme Court of the United States
has declared that an immunity claim is "'conceptually distinct' from the merits of the plaintiff's
claim." Alan K. Chen, The Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of Constitutional

Balancing Tests, 81 IOWA L. REV. 261, 292-93 n.192 (1995) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
U.S. 511,527-28 (1985)). See also Hudson v. City of Chicago, No. 03-L-8516, slip op. at 4 (I11.
App. Ct. Mar. 16, 2005) ("[T]here was no adjudication on the merits because immunity deprives
the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction and lack of jurisdiction is not an adjudication on the
merits.").
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circuit court
granted the motion to dismiss, and the plaintiffs
02
appealed. 1

B. The Appellate Court Decision: Res JudicataBars Refiling
In affirming the dismissal, the appellate court relied on Rein's

application of res judicata to situations in which only some claims in a
case are voluntarily

dismissed. 10 3

The court identified

three

components of res judicata necessary to make the prior adjudication
conclusive against future proceedings under the same transaction: (1)
the parties are identical in both lawsuits; (2) an identity of cause of

action exists; and (3) a court of competent jurisdiction rendered a final

10 4
judgment on the merits in the first lawsuit.
The appellate court determined that the involuntary dismissal of the
negligence claim in Hudson I constituted a final judgment and barred
the filing of Hudson 11.105 Even an involuntary dismissal based on
statutory immunity may be a final judgment and bar a subsequent claim
under res judicata. 10 6 Because both the negligence and the willful and

wanton conduct claims arose from the same group of operative facts,
the court determined that the two claims represented an identity of cause
of action, and, therefore, should have been litigated together in Hudson

102. Hudson, No. 03-L-8516, slip op. at 4 (appealing the trial court's findings that the
application of immunity did not raise jurisdictional issues and was, therefore, an adjudication on
the merits and res judicata barred the refiled claim).
103. Id. at 6. See Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 665 N.E.2d 1199, 1208 (Ill. 1996) (holding
that an involuntary dismissal on a partial claim may bar refiling the action under res judicata if the
remaining claims are voluntarily dismissed). For a more detailed analysis of Rein, see supra Part
II.C.1 (discussing the decision in Rein and the reasoning of the court in its decision).
104. Hudson, No. 03-L-8516, slip op. at 5 ("[R]es judicata applies if: (1) a court of competent
jurisdiction rendered a final judgment on the merits in the first lawsuit; (2) an identity of cause of
action exists; and (3) the parties or their privies are identical in both lawsuits.") (citation omitted).
The plaintiffs did not dispute the identity of parties, but they did contend that there was no final
judgment and no identity of cause of action. Id. at 4.
105. Id. at 5-6 (relying on Illinois Supreme Court Rule 273, which provides that "unless the
order of dismissal .. . provides otherwise, an involuntary dismissal of a cause of
action... operates as an adjudication on the merits").
106. Id. at 6 (citing Robertson v. Winnebago County Forest Preserve Dis., 703 N.E.2d 606,
612 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998), abrogated on unrelated grounds by Kingbrook Inc. v. Pupors, 779
N.E.2d 867, 871 (111. 2002)) (determining that because the allegations in the Survival Act
complaint were identical to the allegations in the wrongful death claim, the doctrine of res
judicata barred the Survival Act complaint). The court refused to apply any precedent on final
judgments that discussed the "identity of parties" element. Hudson, No. 03-L-8516, slip op. at 7
(citing DeLuna v. Treister, 708 N.E.2d 340, 349 (I11.1999); Leow v. A.B. Freight Lines, Inc., 676
N.E.2d 1284, 1289 (I11. 1997); Downing v. Chi. Transit Auth., 642 N.E.2d 456, 459-60 (Ill.
1994)). See also Gimbel, supra note 1, at 406-07 (discussing personal res judicata).

2009]
1.107

Free to Litigate or Free from Litigation

1013

Following the appellate court's decision, the plaintiffs filed a

108
petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court.

C. The Illinois Supreme Court Decision: Making Rein in a Whole New
Way
After granting leave to appeal, in a 4-2 decision, the Illinois Supreme
Court affirmed the dismissal of Hudson 1. Relying heavily on the its
decision in Rein, the court held that allowing the Hudson plaintiffs to
refile their claim violated both res judicata principles and the rule
09
against claim splitting. 1
1. The Majority Opinion: Rein with Brackets
Writing for the court, Chief Justice Thomas held that the doctrine of
res judicata barred Hudson H1.110 After the court first established that
the requirements for identity of parties and identity of cause of action

were not at issue in this case, it turned its11analysis
to the determination
1

of whether there was a final adjudication.
The court determined that the involuntary dismissal of the negligence
claim constituted an adjudication on the merits and became a final
decision after the entering of the voluntary dismissal; therefore, it was

107. Hudson, No. 03-L-8516, slip op. at 9, 11 (determining that none of the exceptions to the
rule against claim splitting applied in this case); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §
24(1) (1982) ("When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the plaintiffs
claim ... the claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the
defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out
of which the action arose."). Furthermore, since plaintiffs included a catch-all "otherwise
negligent" allegation against the defendants in Hudson II, the refiled claim almost perfectly
resembled Hudson 1. Hudson, No. 03-L-8516, slip op. at 9. Because of the "otherwise negligent"
claim, the court determined that there was an identity of cause of action because the original
claim and the refiled claim were virtually identical. Id. In supporting the identity of cause of
action analysis, the appellate court determined that both the original claim and the refiled claim
arose out of the same group of operable facts, "namely the 911 call and the alleged delay in
sending an advanced life support vehicle." Id.
108. See Plaintiff's Petition for Leave to Appeal, supra note 91, at 2-3 (praying for leave to
appeal from the Illinois Supreme Court on the grounds that the appellate court decision overextended the ruling in Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 665 N.E.2d 1199 (il. 1996), and will have a
chilling effect on the filing of novel claims).
109. Hudson v. City of Chicago, 889 N.E.2d 210, 213 (111. 2008) See also Rein, 665 N.E.2d at
1205 (discussing, in identical language, the res judicata effect of a prior final judgment on a
partial claim).
110. Id. at 214 (citing Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Dev., Inc., 687 N.E.2d 871, 874 (111.1997)
(holding that once all claims in a multi-claim suit are resolved, all orders become final and
appealable)).
111. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 213. The plaintiffs did not dispute either identity of cause of
action or identity of parties on appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. Id.
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binding on the entire case for the purpose of res judicata." 2 Therefore,
the court held that refiling the willful and wanton claim did not continue
the original suit, but began an entirely new action. 1 13 As in Rein, the
legislatively-created right to refile after a voluntary dismissal did not
automatically immunize the plaintiffs against all legitimate defenses
that the defendant may assert, including res judicata. 1 14 Relying on
Rein, the court held that res judicata may bar the refiling of a claim that

has been voluntarily dismissed where a final judgment has been entered
115
on another part of the case.
The court further asserted that the refiled claim was barred because it
could have been litigated in Hudson 1.116 Even though the willful and
wanton conduct claim was not adjudicated on the merits, the plaintiffs
were barred from refiling it because it should have been litigated
together with the negligence claim, both of which arose out of the same
operative facts. 117 By refiling the new action, the plaintiffs engaged in
impermissible claim splitting. 118
112. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 214 (citing Dubina, 687 N.E.2d at 874). Voluntary dismissals of
remaining claims in a multi-claim suit may be used to make non-final orders final and appealable.
See Cochran, supra note 49, at 982 (discussing this effect of voluntary dismissals).
113. Id. at 217 (citing Dubina, 687 N.E.2d at 875 for its determination that a refiled action is a
new and distinct action under section 13-217).
114. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 217 (citing Rein, 665 N.E.2d at 1208); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21009 (2006); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-217 (2006). Because the plaintiffs met the four
requirements specified in section 2-1009 and refiled Hudson 11 within one year of the dismissal of
Hudson 1, as required by section 13-217, they met the requirements of these two statutes
regulating the granting and refiling of voluntary dismissals. See supra Part II.A-B (discussing
these statutes and other provisions regarding the practice of voluntary dismissals).
115. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 217. The plaintiffs asserted that Nowak v. St. Rita High School is
a more accurate precedent to apply where the plaintiffs were barred by the circuit court from
refiling the state claim in state court under res judicata after the federal court declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction. Nowak v. St. Rita High Sch., 757 N.E.2d 471, 481 (Il. 2001). The
Illinois Supreme Court determined that since there was no adjudication on the merits of the claim,
the refiled state claim was not barred, distinguishing a previous decision in River Park, Inc. v.
City of Highland Park,703 N.E.2d 883 (Il1. 1998), in which the court determined that the plaintiff
did not have his "day in court." Id. at 479 (citing River Park).
116. Id. at 213. "[I]f the three requirements of res judicata are met and the [refiled counts]
could have been determined in [the previous suit], plaintiffs will be barred from litigating the
[refiled counts]." Id. at 215 (quoting Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 665 N.E.2d 1199, 1206 (Ill.
1996)). For the court's discussion surrounding the principle that res judicata bars any claim that
may have been raised in the previous claim regardless of whether the party raised it, see LaSalle
Nat'l Bank v. County Bd. of Sch. Trs., 337 N.E.2d 19, 22 (111. 1975) (discussing that res judicata
extends to matter decided in an original action as well as to matters that could have been
decided). See also Gimbel, supra note 1, at 407 (evaluating the three elements of res judicata).
117. Id. at 217 (citing Rein, 665 N.E.2d at 1206). The Restatement (Second) of Judgments
requires that the two claims arise from the same transaction and states that what constitutes a
"transaction" should "be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as
whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient
trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations .... "
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The court also determined that none of the exceptions to the rule
against claim splitting existed in Hudson.119 It found Rein and Hudson
factually similar because the plaintiffs in both cases chose to voluntarily
dismiss their claims, and neither case fell under one of the exceptions to
120
the rule.
Rein, according to the court, was not intended as an anti-abuse
doctrine to prevent attorneys from using voluntary dismissal to get
around the denial of a Rule 304(a) order. 12 1 Even though Rein
articulated three policy justifications, which included protecting trial
courts' ability to decide when to grant partial appeal under 304(a), the
Hudson court determined that these policy justifications were not Rein's
ultimate holding. 122 Avoiding the distinction between the attorney's
aggressive behavior in Rein and the actual hardship faced by those in
Hudson after the death of their attorney, the court held that attorneys'
subjective intent in taking voluntary dismissal could not be considered

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(2) (1982).
118. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (1982) (defining the types of
claims that cannot be split as claims or remedies "with respect to all or any part of the
transaction... out of which the action arose"); see also supra note 56 (listing two of the six
exceptions to the rule against claim splitting).
119. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 216 (quoting Rein, 665 N.E.2d at 1207); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(b) cmt. b (1982) (discussing the ways in which a court may
preserve an action for litigation). See supra note 56 and accompanying text (listing two of the six
exceptions to the rule against claim splitting). The court did make a suggestion that plaintiffs ask
defendants to acquiesce to the claim splitting, and if the defendants refused, then the plaintiffs
would be better able to make an informed decision on whether to proceed with a voluntary
dismissal. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 220 ("If the defendant is unwilling to [acquiesce in the
refiling], the [plaintiffs] attorney will know that he proceeds at his peril."). See infra Part V.A.2
(discussing the new leverage that defendants will have in the motion practice of plaintiff's
attorneys).
120. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 218 (citing Rein, 665 N.E.2d at 1207); Nowak, 757 N.E.2d at 479
(finding that an exception to the rule against claim splitting did apply because a final judgment
could not have been reached under section 26(1)(c) of the Second Restatement of Judgments).
The plaintiff in Rein arguably took a voluntary dismissal in order to circumvent the court's
decision to deny a Rule 304(a) order while the plaintiff in Hudson arguably took a voluntary
dismissal in good faith because of being unprepared for trial after the unexpected death of the
attorney before trial. Hudson, 889 N.E. 2d at 232 (Kilbride, J., dissenting).
121. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 219 (citing Rein, 665 N.E.2d at 1199).
122. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 222. The three policy justifications articulated by the Rein court
were (1) the holding prevents parties from splitting their claims through a voluntary dismissal,
obtaining a final judgment on one of the undismissed claims, and, if unsuccessful in the litigation
of the undismissed claims, refiling the previously dismissed claims at a later time; (2) the ruling
would prohibit plaintiffs from attempting to circumvent a judge's refusal of a Rule 304(a)
certification through a voluntary dismissal; and (3) the court recognized its right to regulate the
judicial system in order to avoid burdening the courts with "duplicative" litigation. Rein, 665
N.E.2d at 1208.
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The court next discussed the potential chilling effect Hudson would
have on novel and speculative theories of relief. 124 It cautioned
plaintiffs' attorneys to weigh the assertion of speculative claims with
the possibility of surrendering the right to refile the sound claims at a
later time. 125 The court also held that its decision does not encroach on

legislative power because, in enacting section 13-217, the Illinois
General Assembly never addressed the issue of refiling a partial
claim
126
after final judgment on another claim within the same litigation.
The court only articulated two possible ways in which the result in
Hudson could have been different from Rein: (1) that res judicata does

not apply equally to similar situations of refiling voluntarily dismissed
claims after a final judgment has been entered, or (2) that res judicata
does apply to these situations, but one of the exceptions applies to
Hudson that was applicable in Rein. 12 7 The court rejected both

possibilities.1

28

123. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 219. "An attorney's subjective motivation in taking a voluntary
dismissal is not a part of a res judicata analysis." Id. The plaintiffs argued that Rein was intended
as a "case-specific, anti-abuse doctrine." Id. See also Plaintiff's Petition for Leave to Appeal,
supra note 91, at 7 (providing that the attorney abuse in Rein warranted the court's holding in that
particular case but asserting that, since no such abuse exists in Hudson, this case should be
decided differently).
124. Id. at 218. When bringing a multi-claim suit, there is a strong likelihood that the claims
will be dealt with piecemeal, and Hudson would effectively limit the plaintiffs opportunities with
its remaining claims once an involuntary dismissal has been entered on one of the claims in the
suit. Id.
125. Id. at 220.
126. Id. at 221; 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-217 (2006); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1009
(2006). But see Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem. Hosp., No. 2006 L 12109, slip op. at 3-4 (Cir. Ct. Cook
County, Nov. 13, 2007) (discussing the changes made by the Illinois General Assembly to
various aspects of tort law in the state, not including the statutes regulating voluntary dismissals,
which supports the argument that the General Assembly intended to protect the rights conferred
under these statutes because, in previous reform, these statutes have been altered), cert. granted,
Nos. 105741 & 105745. See infra Part IV.C (discussing in greater detail the other possible intent
of the Illinois General Assembly to preserve the right to refile voluntarily dismissed litigation in
recent tort reform).
127. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 220. See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing how Hudson did actually
meet this second possibility that the court indicated would distinguish Hudson from Rein if an
exception from the rule against claim splitting existed by supporting the notion of fundamental
fairness).
128. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 220 ("We do not find any indication in Rein that its holding was
meant to be limited to these two situations.").
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2. Justice Kilbride's Dissent: Concern and Disappointment
Justice Kilbride, joined by Justice Fitzgerald, disagreed with the
majority's complete reliance on Rein and asserted the paramount
importance of the "without prejudice" language of a voluntary
dismissal. 12 9 The dissent asserted that Rein was decided correctly, but
for the wrong reasons, and that the court in Hudson should have limited
or overruled Rein because the case has proven unworkable.13 ° Rein, it
suggested, was limited to situations involving attorney abuse and
misconstrued the interplay between Supreme Court Rule 273 and
13
sections 2-1009 and 13-217 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. 1
According to the dissent, Rein relied merely on dicta in finding that a
voluntary dismissal could operate as an adjudication of a claim on its
merits. 13 2 Despite the majority's contention, the court in Rein never
made the connection between an adjudication on the merits and a final
appealable order. 133 Therefore, the dissent asserted that the plaintiffs'

129. Id. at 223 (Kilbride, J., dissenting).
130. Id. ("I believe that this court should now take the opportunity to limit or overrule Rein.").
131. Id.; ILL. SUP. CT. R. 273 (providing in relevant part that "an involuntary dismissal of an
action, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join an
indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits"); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21009 (2006) (providing that a court's grant of a voluntary dismissal is "without prejudice"); 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-217 (2006) (providing that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice may be
refiled within one year of the order granting the dismissal).
132. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 224 (Kilbride, J., dissenting) (citing Downing v. Chi. Transit
Auth., 642 N.E.2d 456, 458 (I11.1994) for its decision in the case on statute of limitations grounds
rather than on the res judicata doctrine).
133. Id.; ILL. SuP. CT. R. 273 (not discussing the relationship between an adjudication on the
merits created by an involuntary dismissal and a final judgment). The final judgment, according
to the majority, was that the voluntary dismissal resolved all claims in the suit, but a voluntary
dismissal is not a final, appealable order. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 662 (8th ed. 2004)
("[F]inal-judgment rule: a party may only appeal from a district court's final decision that ends
the litigation on the merits."). Federal courts have also consistently held that voluntary
dismissals, even when disposing of the entire action and proceeding summary judgment, do not
have a res judicata effect. Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1161 (11th Cir. 2003) (determining
that the claim was not barred by res judicata because an earlier case was dismissed without
prejudice, and thus the merits were not adjudicated); Amadeo v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 290
F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a voluntary dismissal does not have any res judicata
effect even if summary judgment has been entered in another part of the action). Similarly, other
states' highest courts have held that voluntary dismissals may still be refiled without implicating
the doctrine of res judicata even if a final judgment has been reached on another part of the
action. See, e.g., Fairchilds v. Miami Valley Hosp., Inc., 827 N.E.2d 381, 390 (Ohio App. Ct.
2005) (determining that a plaintiff's voluntary dismissal prevented the trial court's previous
summary judgment from applying as a final judgment and from having a res judicata effect on the
refiled voluntarily dismissed count); Westbay v. Gray, 48 P. 800, 801 (Cal. 1897) (finding that
the trial court had no authority to include within the judgment of dismissal an order which
precludes the plaintiff from instituting another action in which "the merits of the controversy
may be litigated").
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voluntary dismissals in Hudson and Rein did not automatically
"convert" the previously filed involuntary dismissal into a final and
134
appealable order.
The dissent also took issue with the difference between the two cases
after the voluntary dismissal was filed. 135 While the dissent agreed with
the principle that all claims that arise from the same set of operative
facts should be litigated together, it argued that this rule is "clearly
inapplicable" in Hudson because all of the claims were filed together in
the original lawsuit. 136 In Rein, the plaintiffs continued to litigate their
involuntarily dismissed claim through the appeals process, while the
plaintiffs in Hudson merely continued to litigate their voluntarily7
13
dismissed claim with the expectation of refiling that claim later.
Justice Kilbride further asserted that by granting the voluntary
dismissal, the court expressly reserved the claim. 138 The dissent
suggested that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice allows for this
reservation of the claim and, therefore, the willful and wanton conduct
claim remained viable in Hudson 11. 139

134. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 225 (Kilbride, J., dissenting) (citing 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21009 (1994) (current version at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1009 (2006)). See also People ex rel.

Burris v. Progressive Land Developers, Inc., 602 N.E.2d 820, 825 (I11.1992) (stating that a final
judgment must adjudicate the substantive rights of the parties); Kinzer v. City of Chicago, 539
N.E.2d 1216, 1220 (Ill. 1989) (determining that, because the new action is merely a continuation
of the previous action, the previous action cannot act as a bar under res judicata); Chapman v.
United Ins, Co. of Am., 602 N.E.2d 45, 46 (I11.2002) (finding that, absent a Rule 304(a) finding,
a party must wait for the trial court to dispose of all claims before an appeal).
135. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 233 (Kilbride, J., dissenting) (discussing how the greatest
differences between Hudson and Rein involve the actions of the attorneys in their motion
practice).
136. Id. (discussing that both the negligence claim and the willful and wanton conduct claim
were in fact filed together in Hudson I as opposed to the willful and wanton conduct claim being
presented for the first time in Hudson II).
137. Id. "The interim period.., was one of inactivity: 'a hiatus, but never a detour."' Id. See
also Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 505-06 (2001) ("The primary
meaning of 'dismissal without prejudice,' we think, is dismissal without barring the plaintiff from
returning later, to the same court, with the same underlying claim" and, thus, permissibly
deviating from a linear course of litigation).
138. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 232 (Kilbride, J., dissenting) (citing Semtek, 531 U.S. at 505-06
for holding that the "primary meaning" of a dismissal without prejudice is to allow the plaintiff to
return to the same court with the same underlying claim); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 26(l)(b) (1980) (providing that an exception to the rule against claim splitting is
that the court preserves the issue for later litigation).
139. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 232, 233 (Kilbride, J., dissenting); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21009(a) (2006). See also Terry W. Schackmann & Barry L. Pickens, The Finality Trap:
Accidentally Losing Your Right to Appeal (Part1), 58 J. MO. B. 78, 83 (2002) (stating that

"voluntary dismissals without prejudice leave open indefinitely when plaintiffs can reassert the
unresolved claims, limited only by the relevant statute of limitations"). The dissent also asserted
that, because the defendants were not prejudiced by the refiled claim, they waived their objection
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After the petition for rehearing was denied, George Hudson's parents
lost their last chance to adjudicate their willful and wanton conduct
claim against the City of Chicago. 140 The Illinois Supreme Court also
vacated Piagentini, establishing the incontrovertible and thorough
application of res judicata to partial voluntarily dismissed claims if an
involuntary judgment was previously issued to any other part of the
litigation. 141 However, as Part IV will explore, this decision by the
court misapplied the rule against claim splitting14 2and mechanically
applied res judicata as a tool to dispose of litigation.
IV.

ANALYSIS

The Hudson case presented distinguishable facts that warranted
limiting Rein's application solely to cases of attorney abuse. 14 3 The
Hudson court wrongly determined that the plaintiffs engaged in claim
splitting. 144 However, even if the plaintiffs had split their claims, the
split fell neatly within at least two well-founded exceptions to the rule
against claim splitting: (1) the express reservation of claims for later
review by the court and (2) the interest of fundamental fairness. 14 5 The
court also misinterpreted the Illinois General Assembly's intent
regarding the right of plaintiffs to refile their voluntarily dismissed
by filing their objection in an untimely manner, which falls under one of the exceptions to claim
splitting. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 233 ("[The defendants] should have objected at the time the
order was entered, allowing plaintiffs to withdraw their motion.... [D]efendant's silence in
acquiescing to the voluntary dismissal should bar the defendants' stale objection to the refiled
suit."). Many other objections are deemed waived if not brought in a timely manner: objections
to jurisdiction, objections to pleadings, objections to the disposition of motions, etc. See Charles
Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in 5C FED. PRAC. & PROC.
Civ.3D § 1391 (2008) (describing waiver and preservation of objections).
140. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 231 (Kilbride, J., dissenting).
141. Piagentini v. Ford Motor Co., 852 N.E.2d 357, 361 (II1. App. Ct. 2006) (issuing the
motion to the appellate court to vacate in light of the recent Hudson decision), vacated, 866
N.E.2d 1025 (I11.2008), revised, 2009 WL 113459 (11. App. Ct. Jan. 15, 2009). See supra Part
H.C.2 (discussing Piagentini and its relation to Rein as a foil for the court's handling of res
judicata on issues of refiled voluntarily dismissed claims).
142. See infra Part IV (analyzing the issues the court did not fully consider in their application
of Rein to Hudson).
143. See infra Part V.A (addressing why the analysis in Rein should not have been extended
to Hudson because of the absence of abuse regarding voluntary dismissals and Illinois Supreme
Court orders). The Hudson court even proclaimed their decision an "unremarkable exercise" in
"simply insertfing] the case names and concepts" from Hudson to the quoted passage from Rein.
Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 217 (emphasis added).
144. See infra Part V.B (discussing the rule against claim splitting and the distinct difference
between situations that invoke this rule and the situation in Hudson).
145. See infra Part IV.B (illustrating how the factual scenario in Hudson falls within at least
two exceptions of the rule against claim splitting under the Second Restatement of Judgments and
judicial precedent).
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partial claims. 14 6 This Part concludes by discussing the Hudson court's
unarticulated goals: addressing lower court dissent and perceived
47
increases in attorney abuse by voluntarily dismissing claims. 1

A. The Court BroadlyExtended Rein's Application Beyond Cases
Involving Attorney Abuse
Prior to Hudson, courts usually cited Rein only in those narrow

situations where its application of res judicata might prevent attorneys
from abusing voluntary dismissals. 14 8 There are three specific instances
of attorney abuse in that case which were not present in Hudson:149 (1)

the Rein plaintiffs used voluntary dismissal to circumvent a Rule 304(a)

146. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the Illinois General Assembly's intent in drafting section
13-217 to support the assertion that the General Assembly intended to protect the right to refile
partial voluntarily dismissed claims).
147. See infra Part IV.D (presenting two possible goals intended, but not voiced, by the
court's Hudson decision: that Hudson was intended as a warning for consistency among appellate
court districts after Piagentiniand that as a response to growing concerns over plaintiffs abusing
their right to a voluntary dismissal).
148. Plaintiffs Petition for Leave to Appeal, supra note 91, at 8; Piagentini v. Ford Motor
Co., 852 N.E.2d 357, 361 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (asserting that Rein was meant to apply only in
circumstances where a plaintiff appeals an order granting the defendant an involuntary dismissal
while voluntarily dismissing all remaining claims in order to pursue the appeal), vacated, 866
N.E.2d 1025 (Ill. 2008), revised, 2009 WL 113459 (Ill. App. Ct. Jan. 15, 2009). See also Steven
P. Garmisa, Refiled Claim Clears Hurdle Set by Rule Against Claim Splitting, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Aug. 2, 2006, at 10001 (stating that "the problem in Rein was that the plaintiffs misused
the statutes on voluntary dismissal and refiling"). This presumption is also based on the lack of
judicial commentary on the Rein case. See Mason v. Parker, 695 N.E.2d 70, 71 (111. App. Ct.
1998) (discussing Rein in terms of the three elements of res judicata); DeLuna v. Treister, 708
N.E.2d 340, 344 (I11.1999) (using Rein to support the elements of res judicata as well as the
principle that res judicata bars all claims that could have been raised). These cases coupled with
the fact Chicago attorneys are releasing numerous discussions of Hudson support the claim that
Rein was perceived as an anti-abuse case. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Hansen, Recent Illinois Supreme
Court Decisions Concern Res Judicata, Contact-Sport Torts, and an Exception to Merger-ByDeed Doctrine, ILL. INST. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDU., (2008), (noting that the recent Hudson
opinion unveils the risk that a plaintiff takes of being subjected to a future successful res judicata
defense when voluntarily dismissing the claims following any decision on the merits), available
at http://search.freefind.comfind.html?id=27811896 (search "contact sport tort"); Illinois Lawyer
Blog (May 16, 2008), http://www.illinoislawyerblog.com/2008/05/be-wary_of.thevoluntary
1l.htnl (warning attorneys of the wide-reaching application of Hudson); Timothy Chorvat &
Sara S. Ruff, Caution: Res Judicata May Bar the Refiling of a Voluntarily Dismissed Claim, 53
TRIAL BRIEFS ILL. ST. B. ASSOC. 1, 1 (June 2008) available at http://www.jenner.com/
news/pubs item.asp?id--000014699424 ("Hudson serves as a lesson to the unwary wishing to
voluntarily dismiss and refile their actions under section 2-1009 of the Illinois Code: know the
case law related to res judicata or you may find yourself without remedy."); Insurance Defense
Litigator Blog, http://insurancedefenselitigator.blogspot.comi (Jan. 31, 2008) (reporting on the
recent Hudson decision).
149. See infra Part IV.A. While all three of these abuses are dispositive as to why the Hudson
court should not have applied Rein, only the first will be discussed at great length in this section.

2009]

Free to Litigate or Free from Litigation

1021

finding; 150 (2) the attorneys violated section 13-217 by refiling their
voluntarily dismissed claim in nineteen months as opposed to one

year; 151 and (3) the refiled complaint contained the claims that were
involuntarily dismissed in Rein I, even after the involuntary dismissal
52
was upheld on appeal. 1

The Hudson court never addressed this distinction, arguably because
the plaintiffs abided by the statutory time requirement and only refiled
the voluntarily dismissed claim. 153 The court did acknowledge,
however, that the plaintiffs in Hudson dismissed their final claim only
after the unexpected death of their lead attorney, and not, as was the
154
case in Rein, to circumvent an unfavorable ruling by the trial court.
Noticeably lacking in Hudson, therefore, was any culpable motive
underlying the voluntary dismissal. 155 However, the court declared that

150. Brief for the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association (ITLA) as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 3, Hudson v. City of Chicago, 889 N.E.2d 210 (I11.2008) (No. 100466). See also
Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 665 N.E.2d 1199, 1208 (Ill. 1996) ("[This practice] would
emasculate Rule 304(a) by allowing a plaintiff to circumvent a trial judge's denial of a Rule
304(a) certification by refiling previously dismissed counts following an unsuccessful judgment
or appeal on counts not previously dismissed.").
151. Rein, 665 N.E.2d at 1202. This action clearly violates the statutory requirement to refile
voluntarily dismissed claims in Illinois within one year or within the statute of limitations. 735
ILL, COMP. STAT. 5/13-217 (2006). See also May, supra note 6, at 484 (stating the one-year
refiling provision as a requirement of refiling voluntarily dismissed claims).
152. Rein, 665 N.E.2d at 1202 (stating that the only "material difference" between Rein I and
Rein 11 was the pleading of the equitable estoppel defense to the statute of limitations bar, which
was rejected on appeal). By pleading the rescission claims and the equitable estoppel defense
again, the plaintiffs were attempting, in essence, to refile their previous suit in its entirely, which
would be barred by res judicata as an identity of cause of action. See supra note 36 and
accompanying text (detailing the three requirements of res judicata).
153. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 213 (stating that the "central issue is whether the involuntary
dismissal of plaintiffs' negligence claim and plaintiffs' subsequent voluntary dismissal... barred
the refiling of their.

. . claim").

154. See Solimine & Lippert, supra note 6, at 378-79 (discussing that the purpose of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 41 is not only to protect the right of the plaintiff to obtain and refile
a voluntary dismissal, but also to protect defendants from the undue prejudice possible by the
imposition of a unilateral dismissal). The plaintiffs in Hudson pursued a voluntary dismissal for
the very reason such a practice is available: to allow plaintiffs to decide when and how they wish
to proceed with their pleaded claims. See Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 213 (stating that the plaintiff's
motion practice, which supports the assertion that their pursuit of a voluntary dismissal, was
benign).
155. Rein, 665 N.E.2d at 1205 (stating that the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed one of their
claims in order to appeal the involuntary dismissal on their other claims). This practice of using a
voluntary dismissal to dispose of the final claims in a suit in order to make other orders in the suit
final and appealable is a common enough practice, but the Rein court takes issue with the decision
of the attorney to take the voluntary dismissal after the trial court refused to preserve the
remaining claims through another mechanism. See Cochran, supra note 49, at 982 (discussing
how federal courts will allow a voluntary dismissal in order to "manufacture" a final judgment on
the entire action to gain access to the appellate courts).
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taking attorney motivation into consideration would be too cumbersome
56
1

and speculative.
Even if the Hudson attorneys had such a motive, Illinois courts had
previously held that a plaintiff's intent to avoid a dismissal with
prejudice does not alter his right to refile voluntarily dismissed
claims. 157 Judicial precedent establishes that an attorney's motivation
in taking a voluntary dismissal does not impede a plaintiffs access to
that option. 15 8 Hudson, however, stands for the negative principle that
an attorney's motivation in taking a voluntary dismissal cannot be
considered when deciding whether to preserve the right to refile under
section 13-217.159
These two situations have the disparate effect of upholding the
plaintiff's absolute right of a voluntary dismissal on one hand, while
barring the plaintiffs' right to refile that voluntarily dismissed claim on
the other hand. 160 This rule has the illogical effect of granting voluntary
156. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 220 (asserting that the difference between Rein and Hudson, in
this respect, is a "distinction without a difference" because "an attorney's subjective motivation is
not part of a res judicata analysis"). This statement is somewhat inconsistent with other court
determinations that the subjective intent of attorneys may be at issue in motion practice. See
Jerold S. Solovy et al., Sanctions Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 540 PRAC. L.
INST./LITIG. 101, 249 (1996) ("[lIt may be necessary to inquire into the subjective intent of an
attorney or party in filing a pleading, even through the pleading was objectively reasonable."
(citing Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1083 (7th Cir. 1987))).
157. Metcalf v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp., 513 N.E.2d 12, 16 (111. App. Ct. 1989) (determining that
the plaintiff's motive did not alter his absolute right to file for voluntary dismissal); Jacobsen v.
Ragsdale, 513 N.E.2d 1112, 1116 (I11.App. Ct. 1987) (finding that, under section 2-1009, the
right to voluntarily dismiss a claim is absolute "regardless of circumstances or motive"). See also
David F. Herr, et al., Motions Affecting Issues to Be Tried, MOTION PRAC. 4d, § I6.03[C], 16-60
(2002 Supp.) (stating that "a plaintiffs tactical advantage from voluntary dismissal generally
does not constitute sufficient ground for denying the motion").
158. Kilpatrick v. Church of the Nazarene, 531 N.E.2d 1135, 1138-39 (I11.App. Ct. 1988)
(finding that "the voluntary dismissal statute grants plaintiffs the absolute privilege to dismiss
regardless of the circumstances or motive"); Valdovinos v. Luna-Manalac Med. Ctr., Ltd., 764
N.E.2d 1264, 1266 (I11.App. Ct. 2002) (determining that, unless plaintiffs choose to relinquish
their right to file a voluntary dismissal, the right is absolute regardless of other intent or
motivation). See also Solimine & Lippert, supra note 6, at 394 (discussing how, under the federal
rule governing voluntary dismissals, a plaintiff's motivation in obtaining a voluntary dismissal is
rarely discussed because of the difficulties involved).
159. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 219. When addressing voluntary dismissals under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 41, courts have held that attorney intent in refiling voluntarily dismissed
claims after any remand or appeal may be dispositive in determining whether to allow an appeal.
See Schackmann & Pickens, supra note 139, at 83-84 (noting that eight circuits consistently
enforce this rule that voluntary dismissals without prejudice have the effect of destroying
appellate jurisdiction).
160. See generally Rein, 665 N.E.2d at 1208 (declining to review attorney motivation in
obtaining a voluntary dismissal even though the attorney, arguably acting in bad faith, intended to
circumvent the denial of a Rule 304(a) finding in order to appeal an involuntary dismissal);
Hudson, 889 N.E.2d 210 (declining to review attorney motivation in refiling a voluntarily
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dismissals in situations when attorneys act in bad faith, and barring
refiling when attorneys act in good faith. 16 1 When federal courts
determine whether an attorney acted in bad faith under Rule 11, they
look to the factual situation surrounding the attorney's actions under the
circumstances.16 2 The court should have applied this same reasoning in
its analysis of Hudson and found that, because Rein involved three
separate instances of attorney abuse, the circumstances in Hudson were
different enough to allow the refiling of the voluntarily dismissed

claims. 163
B. The Rule Against Claim Splitting Was InappropriatelyApplied
The purpose of the rule against claim splitting is to ensure finality in
litigation, which prevents plaintiffs from harassing defendants and
burdening courts with duplicative litigation. 164 It requires plaintiffs to
dismissed count even though the attorney was, arguably acting in good faith, unprepared for trial
following the death of her father).
161. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). The distinction between an attorney acting in good faith and an
attorney acting in bad faith is considered important by the courts in motion practice under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 11, which provides in relevant part that "by presenting to the court a
pleading, written motion, or other paper ...an attorney certifies that to the best of the person's
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,"
that the motion is presented for a proper purpose and that all factual contentions are supported by
law and evidence. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See also Sybil Louise Dunlop, Are an Empty Head and a
Pure Heart Enough? Mens Rea Standards for Judge-Imposed Rule 11 Sanctions and Their
Effects on Attorney Action, 61 VAND. L. R. 615, 627-31 (2007) (discussing the different
applications of Rule II among federal district courts; notwithstanding the different applications,
the courts use the same principles of good faith or bad faith standards).
162. See SAUL M. KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE II SANCTIONS, at 26 (1985) ("The
court need not delve into the attorney's subjective intent. The record in the case and all of the
surrounding circumstances should be an adequate basis."). See also Dunlop, supra note 161, at
625 (stating that the split application of Rule 11 among the federal circuit courts is whether to
apply a bad faith standard or an objective standard of reasonableness "in circumstances where the
lawyer has no opportunity to withdraw or correct" the alleged violation.).
163. See Plaintiff's Petition for Leave to Appeal, supra note 91, at 8 (arguing against the
application of Rein, and now Hudson, to promote the automatic barring of refiled voluntarily
dismissed claims without consideration to the particular circumstances of the case). While
sanctions under Rule 11 were never at issue in Hudson, the rationale behind determining whether
an attorney acted in bad faith regarding their motion practice should apply to situations regarding
recovery as it does in situations regarding attorney sanctions, especially if future courts are bound
to mechanically bar refiled voluntarily dismissed claims, regardless of the circumstances under
which the claim was voluntarily dismissed. Id. Similarly, the goals behind Rule I I are identical
to the goals purported by the court in its decision in Hudson: "promoting the goal of limiting
harassment, delay and expense .... Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Alla Med. Servs., Inc., 855 F.2d
1470, 1476 (9th Cir. 1988). However, sometimes the court does refuse to apply attorney
motivation as a factor. See Solimine & Lippert, supra note 6, at 378 (discussing an Ohio case
where bad faith was ignored on account of the difficulty of proof, allowing the attorney to obtain
a voluntary dismissal "even at the eleventh hour" (citing State ex rel. Hunt v. Thompson, 586
N.E.2d 107 (Ohio 1992))).
164. Rein, 665 N.E.2d at 1208. See Gimbel, supra note 1, at 404 ("Finality is an important

1024

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 40

litigate all of their relevant claims in one action. 165 The exceptions to
the rule are clearly delineated in the Second Restatement of Judgments
and in courts' application of these provisions. 166 This section will begin
by illustrating that Hudson did not involve claim splitting and why,
even if it had, that the case fell under at least two exceptions to the
7

rule. 16

1. Plaintiffs Did Not Engage in Claim Splitting
The rule against claim splitting is designed to prevent plaintiffs from

pursuing their claims in "two conflicting lines of litigation."' 168 Courts,
therefore, attempt to prevent plaintiffs from the circular practice of
pursuing certain claims at the trial or appellate level while attempting to
preserve other claims through a voluntary dismissal. 169 This exact
goal in litigation ....
").Gimbel's article goes on to discuss the relationship between res judicata,
the parent-doctrine to the rule against claim splitting and finality. Id. While this may be the
purpose of claim splitting, this overarching goal of finality is not necessarily a good thing. See
Laura Gaston Dooley, The Cult of Finality: Re-thinking Collateral Estoppel in the Postmodern

Age, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 43, 60 (1996) (arguing that the courts' pre-occupation with finality leads
to the application of numerous inequitable rulings).
165. See Rein, 665 N.E.2d at 1206 (stating that the rule against claim splitting bars a plaintiff
from "suing for part of a claim in one action and then suing for the remainder in another action."
(citing Baird & Warner, Inc. v. Addison Indus. Park, Inc., 387 N.E.2d 831, 837 (Ill.
App. Ct.
1979), which discusses the inability of a party to maintain several causes of action for recovery on
one suit))); Radosta v. Chrysler Corp., 443 N.E.2d 670, 672 (111. App. Ct. 1982) (applying the rule
against claim splitting to receiving damages); Thorleif Larsen & Son, Inc., v. PPG Indus., Inc.,
532 N.E.2d 423, 427 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (determining that, while claim splitting may be a good
tactical decision, it is still not permissible in Illinois); Best Coin-Op, Inc. v. Paul F. Ilg Supply
Co., 545 N.E.2d 481, 493-94 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1989) (detailing situations in which the rule against
claim splitting bars subsequent actions)). This rule includes filing any theories of relief arising
from one claim in the same suit. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25 cmt. d (1982)

(discussing how the filing of new theories of relief under the same transaction is barred by res
judicata under the rule against claim splitting).
166. See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the relevant exceptions to the rule against claim
splitting).
167. See infra Part IV.B (arguing that the factual scenario in Hudson does not implicate the
rule against claim splitting and presenting two possible exceptions to the rule against claim
splitting under the facts in Hudson: that the court preserved the willful and wanton claim for later
litigation and that fundamental fairness requires the permissibility of the split claims in this

particular case given the death of the lead attorney).
168. Plaintiff's Petition for Leave to Appeal, supra note 91, at 9. The drafters of the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments stated that the rule against claim splitting is "willing to
tolerate changes in direction of the course of litigation," but the fact that the plaintiffs in Hudson
pursued only one claim and its valid directional course through a refiled voluntary dismissal
strengthens the assertion that the plaintiffs did not engage in claim splitting of any kind because
they plead all of their bases for recovery under one transaction in one suit and only pursued the
litigation of the intact action, and after voluntarily dismissing the remaining claim, only pursuing
that remaining claim. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982).

169. Rein, 665 N.E.2d at 1208 ("If plaintiffs were permitted to proceed [with refiling] any
plaintiff could file an action with multiple counts, dismiss some but not all of the counts, obtain a
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situation occurred in Rein, where the plaintiffs appealed an involuntarily
dismissed claim while attempting to preserve a voluntarily dismissed
claim leveling the trial court. 170 Therefore, the plaintiffs effectively
the same jurisdiction,
split their claims among more than one court17of
1
which violates the rule against claim splitting.
In Hudson, however, once the circuit court entered an involuntary
dismissal, the plaintiffs ceased to pursue that claim. 172 Similarly, when
the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their other claim, the period between
the dismissal and the refiling of the voluntarily dismissed claim was one

final judgment on the undismissed counts, and if unsuccessful on the counts not dismissed, refile
the previously dismissed counts."). This cyclical handling of claims would, arguably, lead to the
permissible refiling of claims resulting in interminable litigation, thus undermining the purpose of
res judicata to protect courts and defendants from the harassment of duplicitous litigation. Id.
While this seems to be the current prerogative of the court currently, neither Rein nor Hudson
address the drafters' discussion in the Second Restatement of Judgments of the effect of a
voluntary dismissal on claim splitting in general when an involuntary dismissal against the
plaintiff has already been reached on another claim under section 20, which states that "a personal
judgment for the defendant, although valid and final, does not bar another action by the plaintiff
on the same claim if ...the plaintiff agrees to or elects a nonsuit (or voluntary dismissal) without
prejudice." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 20(1)(b)(1) (1982).
170. Plaintiffs Petition for Leave to Appeal, supra note 91, at 2. .See also Cochran, supra
note 49, at 979 (discussing the prevalence of this practice given the tightening avenues of appeal
available for litigants and how voluntary dismissals are becoming a tool by which parties can
achieve a unilateral final judgment as opposed to using voluntary dismissals to preserve claims
for later adjudication). A point of note regarding the phenomenon of using voluntary dismissals
to obtain a final judgment is that federal judges appear to encourage the practice, whereas in
Illinois, the courts view the practice with disdain. Id.
171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982) (providing that a final, appealable
judgment on one count will bar the litigation of another count arising from the same transaction).
This situation, however, does not exist by pursuing a single line of litigation through the
permissible practice of refiling voluntarily dismissed claims without prejudice. See Ziff, supra
note 2, at 944 (asserting that dismissals without prejudice do not usually implicate res judicata
because of the court's explicit order stating that the dismissal is without prejudice and may be
refiled again (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26 cmt. b, reporter's note (2002)
to support the rule that each jurisdiction must determine the effect of a voluntary dismissal, but it
notes that a voluntary dismissal acting as a bar is "reasonable" when the defendant is not even
aware of the complaint-a situation not present in Hudson))).
172. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 215. Under federal law, a voluntary dismissal does not have a res
judicata effect because it is not a final judgment and may be refiled without implicating the rule
against claim splitting. ProceduralMeans of Enforcement Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 37 GEO. L.J.
ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 990, 1008 n.3000 (2008) (citing Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1161
(11th Cir. 2003), which determined that a prisoner's section 1983 claim was not barred by res
judicata because earlier case dismissed without prejudice, and thus merits not adjudicated)). See
also Amadeo v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 290 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a
voluntary dismissal does not have any res judicata effect even if summary judgment has been
entered in another part of the action) (citing Lawlor v. Nat'l Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322,
3237 (1955) for the proposition that if a nonsuit is not accompanied by findings of law or fact, it
does not have the res judicata effect of barring other claims in the transaction, even if a summary
judgment has been issued on another claim in the action)).
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of "inactivity."' 173 The plaintiffs did not appeal the trial court's
involuntary dismissal or continue litigating their negligence claim in
any way.174 Instead, they waited to refile their willful and wanton
1 75
conduct claim.
2. Even If Plaintiffs Split Their Claims, Hudson Falls Within Two
Exceptions to the Rule Against Claim Splitting
Even if Hudson was an example of claim splitting, it was permissible
claim splitting. 176 While other exceptions exist, this section will discuss
two specifically: (1) that by granting the voluntary dismissal, the court
preserved plaintiffs' claims for later litigation, and (2) that the concept
of fundamental fairness requires an exception be made in this
77
situation.1
First, under the Second Restatement of Judgments, plaintiffs may split
claims if the court expressly reserves their right to maintain the second
claim at a later time. 17 8 The United States Supreme Court has also
173. Petition for Rehearing at 9-10, Hudson, 889 N.E.2d 210 (No. 100466) ("[I]n every other
case, the plaintiffs had improperly split their cause of action into two conflicting lines of litigation
or took the nonsuit in order to appeal other claims."). By deciding not to pursue an appeal on
their involuntarily dismissed claim or instituting any new actions, the plaintiffs in Hudson did not
engage in claim splitting through any of the articulated violations, and the court gave no reason
why this situation should create a new example of impermissible claim splitting. Id.
174. Plaintiff's Petition for Leave to Appeal, supra note 91, at 9.
175. Id. See Schackmann & Pickens, supra note 139, at 84 (2002) (discussing how a Rule
54(b) order by a federal court, which certifies the existence of separate claims, does not "dilute
the fundamental rule against splitting a cause of action and deciding appellate cases piecemeal."
(quoting Page v. Preisser, 686 F.2d 336, 339 (8th Cir. 1978), which held that claim splitting is
still an impermissible practice if multiple claims are being adjudicated at multiple levels of the
appellate process regardless of a court's certification of the split itself)).
176. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26 (1982) (listing the six exceptions to
the rule against claim splitting). While this Part will not address it in any length, the defendants
also acquiesced to the split claims. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(a) (2004).
The defendants acquiesce to the split because they did not object to the voluntary dismissal
without prejudice, which implied a future refiling. See infra notes 219-22 (discussing the
applicability of this exception to Hudson). See also supra note 139 and accompanying text
(discussing Justice Kilbride's argument for the application of this exception and supporting law).
177. See supra Part IV.B.1 (applying one of the exceptions to the rule against claim splitting
under the Second Restatement of Judgments section 26 and a general common law principle).
178. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(l)(b) (1982) ("[T]he court in the first
action has expressly reserved the plaintiffs right to maintain the second action," which is
accomplished through language that a judgment is without prejudice and may be expressed in
"the judgment itself, in the findings of fact, conclusions of law, opinion, or similar record."). In
essence, this exception represents the opposite impact that judgments usually have, in that their
preclusive effect is not usually realized in any "immediate or executory" way. See Wolff, supra
note 45, at 751 (discussing the effect of this exception). Instead, the court realizes the potential
impact of the order or judgment under this exception and explicitly excludes the present situation
from a bar under res judicata and the rule against claim splitting. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 26(b) (1982).
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determined that the inherent purpose of voluntary dismissals without
prejudice is to allow a plaintiff to return to the same court and refile the
same underlying claim. 179 Such dismissals are, by definition, "without

prejudice" and do not usually invoke res judicata because they do not
adjudicate the merits of the claim. 180 Because there is no appeal from a
voluntary dismissal, the right to refile the claim represents the only way
in which a decision on the merits may be obtained after a voluntary
dismissal. 181
In addition to the fact that, in granting voluntary dismissal the trial
court expressly preserved the Hudson's second claim, considerations of
179. Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 505-06 (2001) ("The primary
meaning of 'dismissal without prejudice,' we think, is dismissal without barring the plaintiff from
returning later, to the same court, with the same underlying claim" and is not impermissible claim
splitting.). See also May, supra note 6, at 484 (discussing the effect of a voluntary dismissal
"without prejudice" as allowing an absolute right of plaintiff's to refile their voluntarily dismissed
claims within the statutorily prescribed period of one year under 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-217
(1994) (current version at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-217)). Even when the court does not
include the phrase "without prejudice," the intention of the court to preserve the claim for later
adjudication has been enough to fall under this exception to the rule against claim splitting. See
Gishwiller v. Hobart. 79 N.E.2d 846, 850 (Il1. App. Ct. 1948) (determining that even though an
order of dismissal does not contain the words "without prejudice," judgment of dismissal is not
res judicata to a new proceeding for the same cause of action between the same parties because no
judgment was made on the merits of the claim).
180. JANET WALKER ET AL., THE CivIL LITIGATION PROCESS 454 (6th ed. 2005) ("[I1f the
prior court did not get to the merits of the plaintiff's claim, but dismissed the proceeding on some
preliminary or procedural point, it would be too harsh to foreclose the plaintiff."). Courts at the
state level in Illinois, as well as the United States Supreme Court, have also highlighted the
importance of this feature in applying res judicata. See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ., 466 U.S. 75, 77 n.1 (1984) (discussing the requirement of an adjudication on the merits
under the definition of res judicata); Liddell v. Smith, 213 N.E.2d 604, 608 (I11.App. Ct. 1965)
(finding that even though defendants were defaulted, the plaintiff could still assert a previously
voluntarily dismissed claim in a subsequent action because of the absolute right to refile a
voluntarily dismissed claim). This right to voluntarily dismiss and refile a claim, therefore,
allows a plaintiff to deviate from the normal course of litigation. Reply Brief of Appellants at 2,
Hudson v. City of Chicago, 889 N.E.2d 210 (I11.2008) (No. 100466) ("In expressly allowing a
plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss a case without prejudice, § 2-1009 is clearly intended to afford a
plaintiff a respite from the normal course of litigation.").
181. See Resurgence Fin., L.L.C. v. Kelly, 875 N.E.2d 679, 682 (I1l. App. Ct. 2007) (finding
that even though summary judgment preceded the voluntary dismissal, the voluntary dismissal
did not qualify as a final, appealable order or a procedural step toward final judgment); Koffski v.
Vill. of N. Barrington, 609 N.E.2d 364, 370 (III. App. Ct. 1993) (finding that, as a rule, plaintiffs
are prevented from appealing an order granting a voluntary dismissal on the basis that their
absolute right to refile protects the re-litigation of the claim at a later date); Edward E. Gillen Co.
v. City of Lake Forest, 581 N.E.2d 739, 741 (111.App. Ct. 1991) (determining that a plaintiff is
protected from prejudice by the absolute right to refile voluntarily dismissed litigation even
though an order granting voluntary dismissal is not appealable). See also Note, Claim Preclusion
in Modern Latent Disease Cases: A Proposalfor Allowing Second Suits, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1989, 1996-97 (1990) (discussing the effect of a court's finding that the same claim may be
brought at a later time and recognizing this exception in cases dealing with the foreseeability of
future illness).
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fundamental fairness and substantial justice favor permitting the claim

to be refiled. 182 The plaintiffs in Hudson filed for voluntary dismissal
on their remaining claims only after the death of the lead attorney and
their resulting inability to prepare for trial in the given time. 183 There
was no ill will on the part of the plaintiffs' attorney in Hudson because

the attorney's untimely death was certainly not an event for which he
could have prepared. 184 Thus, courts should examine the circumstances

giving rise to a voluntary dismissal
and consider whether its decision
18 5
may cause an unjust result.
Voluntary dismissal should usually fall under one of these exceptions
to the rule against claim splitting.as was the case in Hudson. 186 Even if
these exceptions do not apply, fairness would warrant a preservation of

87
the voluntarily dismissed claim in Hudson for later adjudication. 1

182. Weisman v. Schiller, Ducanto & Fleck, 733 N.E.2d 818, 822 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) ("[Tlhe
doctrine of res judicata need not be applied where fundamental fairness so requires."); see also
Pelon v. Wall, 634 N.E.2d 385, 388 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (holding that the courts need not apply
the doctrine of res judicata so technically as to create unjust results, but instead, the courts must
determine whether a second suit will "advance the goals of judicial economy and fairness").
183. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 230 (Kilbride, J., dissenting). In cases dealing with delay as a
result of the serious illness or death of the attorney, the court may excuse the delay where justice
requires the excuse under the particular circumstances in the case. Theresa L. Leming & Jeanne
Philbin, 24 AM. JUR. DISMISSAL § 74 (2008) (stating that how the death or illness of an attorney
or party is handled may depend on the nature of the controlling statute or rule of practice).
184. See IVAN TURGENEV, A HOUSE OF GENTLEFOLK 182 (1917) ("The most ordinary,
inevitable, though always unexpected event, death[.]"). Obtaining a voluntary dismissal as a
result of the death of a vital member of the litigation is markedly different from the tactical
decision in Rein to pursue a voluntary dismissal after being denied the ability to appeal a partial
claim. See Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 665 N.E. 2d 1199, 1205 (Ill. 1996) (clarifying why the
doctrine of res judicata barred the plaintiffs' claim).
185. Monica Renee Brownewell, Rethinking the Restatement View (Again!): Multiple
Independent Holdings and the Doctrine of Issue Preclusion, 37 VAL. U. L. REV 879, 890-91
(2003) (discussing this exception in terms of "unfairness" to the party being barred from litigating
a claim and stating that the goal of res judicata is to promote "fairness and orderliness"); Pelon,
634 N.E.2d at 388. See also Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 250 (1998) (discussing
how the "fairness" concerns of res judicata include both fairness to the defendant in being free
from duplicative litigation and fairness to the plaintiff in having a "full and fair" opportunity to
litigate their claims (quoting Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461,480-81 (1982)).
186. See Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 213 (describing the motions process of Hudson and how the
only remaining claim that the plaintiffs were litigating was their refiled voluntarily dismissed
claim). Taken together, the voluntary dismissal statutes imply that a voluntary dismissal without
prejudice is not fulfilled until the claim is refiled because the court expressly reserved that claim
for a later date, which uses the same language as the exception to the rule against claim splitting.
See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1009 (2006) (allowing the plaintiff to obtain a voluntary dismissal
without prejudice); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-217 (2006) (stating that because the voluntary
dismissal is without prejudice, it can be refiled within a year, thus fulfilling the "without
prejudice" language).
187. See DONALD A. DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT & INNOCENCE 112 (2003) (discussing that, in
criminal law, the United States Supreme Court defined the concept of "fundamental fairness" as a
broad concept "to be tested by an appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case" (quoting Betts

2009]

Free to Litigate or Free from Litigation

1029

C. The Illinois General Assembly Intended Section 13-217 to Allow
Plaintiffs to Refile PartialClaims
In addition to its refusal to apply any of the general exceptions to the
rule against claim splitting, the court never addressed either the fllinois
General Assembly's intent in enacting section 13-217, or its reasons for
altering the statute. 188 In general, the legislature has consistently used
the phrase, "without prejudice," to denote a preservation of rights, so

the use of this language in section 13-217 seems to implicitly preserve
an issue for later litigation. 189 Even in recent extensive tort reform
initiatives, the General Assembly did not alter any provisions in section
13-217.190 This inaction is a strong inference that they did not intend to
change its original goal of affording plaintiffs the right to refile

voluntarily dismissed claims.
Until Hudson, the court had been reticent to establish any other
limitations to the refiling provision without the General Assembly's
v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942))). In Hudson, the totality of the facts give rise to the
conclusion that the voluntarily dismissed claims should be refiled because of the situation in
which the plaintiffs found themselves: unprepared for trial after the unexpected death of their
attorney and with the adjudication of their case resting on the one claim. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at
230 (Kilbride, J., dissenting).
188. See Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 222-23 ("[W]e see no basis for concluding that the
legislature intended in sections 2-1009 and section 13-217 to give plaintiffs an absolute right to
split their claims."). But see supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing Illinois courts'
analysis of section 13-217 to prescribe an absolute right to refile voluntarily dismissed litigation).
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments also discusses the effect of even partial voluntarily
dismissed claims as being presumed capable of refiling unless the rule of the particular
jurisdiction has determined differently. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26 cmt. b

(1982).
189. This intent may also be seen throughout references made to the section as the "savings
statute" by both courts and legislative bodies. See, e.g. Act of Aug. 22, 2008, Pub. Act 95-895,
2008 Ill. Legs. Serv. 2135 (West) (to be codified at 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-308(a)) ("A party
that with explicit reservation of rights performs or promises performance or assents to
performance in a manner demanded or offered by the other party does not thereby prejudice the
rights reserved. Such words as 'without prejudice' ... are sufficient.").
190. See Act of Aug. 25, 2005, Pub. Act 94-0667, 2005 Ill. Laws 4934 (providing various
reforms to different statutes, not including section 13-217, which was amended in the previous
tort reform, an amendment that was later found unconstitutional). See also Lebron v. Gottlieb
Mem'l Hosp., No. 2006 L 12109, slip op. at 3-4 (Cir. Ct. Cook County Nov. 13, 2007)
(discussing the 2005 tort reform statutes and their effect on current legislation, which did not
include section 13-217, even though the previous 1995 tort reform did attempt to modify this
section), cert. granted, Nos. 105741 & 105745. This inference is strong, especially considering
that the General Assembly has attempted to alter section 13-217 in past tort reforms by removing
the one limitation to the refiling provision: the one-year filing requirement. See Best v. Taylor
Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1062 (i1. 1997) (finding P.A. 89n7 unconstitutional in its
entirety, including the deletion of the one year filing requirement). See also Thomas H. Fegan,
This Ruling is Likely to Draw More Litigation, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 8, 1998, at 6 (noting

that the Illinois Supreme Court did not explicitly discuss whether the changes to section 13-217
were unconstitutional).
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approval. 19 1 Given the well-founded definition, intent, and application
of section 13-217, the Hudson court should have provided a more
thorough analysis before drastically changing the statute's understood
92
meaning. 1
D. Hudson's UnarticulatedAgenda: CurbingAbuse
The court clearly enumerated its purpose in Hudson. 193 First, it
stated that its ruling promoted judicial economy. 194 However, Hudson
never posed a risk to efficiency because the plaintiffs were engaged in
the benign practice of voluntarily dismissing their claims and never split
any active claims. 19 5 Even if the situation in Hudson had threatened

191. See Kahle v. John Deere Co., 472 N.E.2d 787, 789 (ill. 1984) ("Any further limits on the
plaintiffs common law rights [to refile voluntarily dismissed litigation] should be enacted by the
legislature, not declared by this court."); Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 213 (detailing Hudson's facts).
192. Michael J. Gallagher & Mary Snyder, Civil Procedure,20 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 215,218-21
(1988) (discussing the different interpretations of section 13-217, and relying on legislative intent
to assert that the right to refile is restricted to one refiling and may not be used to attempt to
circumvent a prior order by the court and citing Gendek v. Jehangir,518 N.E.2d 1051 (111.1988)
and Muskrat v. Sternberg, 521 N.E.2d 932 (il. 1988)); see also Paul Caghan, The Absolute Right
to Refile: A Plain Meaning and Interpretation of Section 24a of the Illinois Limitations ActFranzese v. Trinko, 27 DEPAUL L. REV 533, 533-35 (1977) (discussing Franzese v. Trinko where
the Illinois Supreme Court determined that the General Assembly intended the savings statute to
create an absolute right to refile dismissals without prejudice, and the court held that "no
exception may be read into" the statute, including a judicially-created exception).
193. See Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 221, 223 (directly quoting and applying Rein's underlying
policy interests without taking account of the different facts and procedural elements of the two
cases). This problem of regurgitating Rein is a consistent one for the Hudson court and is most
obvious when talking about the goals of the Rein court that do not apply in this case. Id. at 223
(Kilbride, J., dissenting). A "modem" goal of the judicial system is improving access to the
courts, which is ironic considering Hudson's limiting principles. Frank V. Williams, III,
Reinventing the Courts: The Frontiers of JudicialActivism in the State Courts, 29 CAMPBELL L.
REV. 591, 690 (2007) ("The goals today are essentially the same as those which defined the
notion of access to justice... [illustrated by] recent changes in the judiciary designed to expand
access.").
194. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 221 ("Such a practice would impair judicial economy."). This is
a legitimate and necessary goal. See Ziff, supra note 2, at 910 (stating that the three basic goals
of a procedural system are accuracy, efficiency, and fairness and applying these goals to res
judicata). Specifically, efficiency refers to the "direct costs of litigation," including the money
implicitly spent on lawyers, judges, and clerical expenses. Id.
195. See OFFICE OF JUDGES PROGRAMS, STATISTICS DIVISION, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CASELOAD STATISTICS MARCH 31, 2007, at 52-54 (2007), [hereinafter CASELOAD STATISTICS]
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2007/tables/C04Mar07.pdf (depicting that, of the
254,349 total cases filed in the twelve-month period ending in March 31, 2007, 196,547 were
dismissed or settled before trial, and, of those 196,547 cases, 168,925 were terminated before
pretrial). See also STEVEN K. SMITH ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, NCJ-153177, CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 1992: TORT CASES INLARGE
COUNTIES 1 (1995), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/tcilc.pdf (stating that
seventy-five percent of the torts cases filed in major counties were "disposed through an agreed
settlement or voluntary dismissal").
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judicial economy, this consideration should not trump the paramount
196

importance of fairness to all parties.

Second, the court asserted that its decision protected defendants from
the harassment of duplicative litigation and frivolous claims that require
precious time and money to disprove. 197 While this is a valid concern,
it was not presented in Hudson, where the unexpected death of the
attorney forced the plaintiffs to voluntarily dismiss their otherwise
98
sound claim, and did not prejudice the defendant. 1
Not only did the court's reasoning in Hudson not reflect the factual
distinctions with Rein, but the court also promoted an unarticulated goal
through its decision. 19 9 Hudson represents the court's desire to curb
potential abuses by attorneys regarding voluntary dismissals. 20 0 Courts
have been concerned with the high number of frivolous claims filed by

196. See Anne Krueger & Valerie Alvord, Court Scandal Is a Story of Give and Take, SAN
DIEGO UNION TRIB., Apr. 14, 1996, at A-I (quoting the lead attorney for the defense: this
"scandal" includes "the overwhelming issue that seemed to be on the judge's mind was judicial
economy as opposed to the fairness of consolidating"); Marissa Dawn Lawson, Note, Judicial
Economy at What Cost? An Argument for Finding Binding Arbitration Clauses Prima Facie
Unconscionable, 23 REV. LIT1G. 463, 486-88 (2004) (arguing that binding arbitration clauses are
unconscionable because they promote efficiency in the court system over fairness to litigants).
197. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 221 ("Such a practice would.., effectively defeat the public
policy underlying res judicata, which is to protect the defendant from harassment and.., multiple
litigation."). However, the court never articulates that the doctrine of res judicata was also
intended to serve the dual aims of efficiency and fairness, which involves a plaintiff's right to
their "day in court." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27, cmt. c (1982) (defining
an "issue" as involving "a balancing of important interests: on the one hand, a desire not to
deprive a litigant of an adequate day in court; on the other hand, a desire to prevent repetitious
litigation of what is essentially the same dispute"). Similarly, while the rights regarding
voluntary dismissals have been declared "absolute," the doctrine of res judicata has not been so
defined. See ALLAN D. VESTAL, RES JUDICATA/PRECLUSION 559 (1969) ("Although the interest
of society in the orderly adjudication of matters supports res judicata/preclusion, there are
significant limitations which circumscribe its application.").
198. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 230 (Kilbride, J., dissenting) (discussing the legitimate decision
of the replacement attorney to voluntarily dismiss the claim rather than proceed to trial
unprepared through no reasonable fault of her own). "Reasonable" fault is the standard by which
lawyers are judged when determining whether sanctions are necessary, one of which is to dismiss
a claim with prejudice and incapable of being refiled. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
199. See infra Part IV.B (asserting two possible reasons for the court's decision in Hudson
that were not discussed in the holding: (1) a response to inconsistent applications of the rule from
Rein and (2) a response to prevalent attorney abuses of voluntary dismissals, even though the
attorneys in Hudson did not abuse this motion in the case).
200. See May, supra note 6, at 484-89 (discussing the various limitations under statute and
through court interpretation that have been placed on the right to voluntarily dismiss and refile
claims in recent Illinois jurisprudence); Note, Absolute Dismissal Under FederalRule 41(a): The
Disappearing Right of the Voluntary Nonsuit, 63 YALE L.J. 738, 738 (1954) (responding to
plaintiff abuses of the voluntary dismissal, "[viarious state statutes attempted to avoid abuses by
restricting absolute dismissal").
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plaintiffs over the last few years. 20 1 Similarly, courts have recently
attempted to limit the frequent abuse of voluntary dismissals. 20 2 While
Hudson is not an example of such a situation, the court appears to be

responding to this growing concern by preempting possible abuse by
attorneys who would have used voluntary dismissal to impermissibly
20 3
split claims.
Due to the evident factual differences, Hudson should have been
decided independently from Rein.20 4 Had the Hudson court recognized
the factual differences between the two cases and appropriately limited

the rule against claim splitting, it could have avoided eviscerating
section 13-217's original purpose in permitting voluntary dismissal.20 5
The next Part will address the implications of the court's failure to
20 6
recognize these dispositive distinctions.

201. See Maureen N. Amour, Practice Makes Perfect: Judicial Discretion and the 1993
Amendments to Rule 11, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677, 689 (1996) ("This 'crisis in the courts' [a
'perceived litigation explosion'] motivated the Committee to encourage aggressive judicial
regulation of the litigation process to punish and deter the filing of frivolous claims."). But see
VIVIENNE HARPWOOD, MEDICINE, MALPRACTICE & MISAPPREHENSIONS 83 (2007) ("[A]lthough

fraudulent and frivolous claims are to be frowned upon, there is nothing morally reprehensible,
given the fault-based nature of tort, about using the system legitimately in order to obtain
compensation for the injuries caused by the fault of another."); Joshua D. Kelner, The Anatomy of
an Image: Unpacking the Case for Tort Reform, 31 U. DAYTON L. REV. 243, 288 (2006) ("In
explaining the causes of this crisis, [tort reformers] portrayed the legal system as deluged with
frivolous claims and indicated that it was such meritless lawsuits that dictated the necessity for
reform.").
202. See Vincent P. Cook & Peter W. Schoonmaker, New Limits Needed for Voluntary
Dismissals, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 10, 2004, at 6 (discussing the varied ways in which
plaintiffs will abuse voluntary dismissals and the Illinois courts' response to these abuses). See
also Gibellina v. Handley, 535 N.E.2d 858, 866 (Ill. 1989) ("This step by our court is necessitated
by the noted abusive use of the voluntary dismissal statute."). However, even the court in
Gibellina began its discussion of the alleged abuse of the voluntary dismissal by noting that the
different procedural sequence in each case is important to this analysis. Id. at 860.
203. See Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 217 (implying this very concern); Brief for Defendants at 3551, Hudson, 889 N.E.2d 210 (No. 100466) (discussing the broad application of Rein). However,
even Gibellina, which was directly responding to an attorney abuse of a voluntary dismissal, did
not actually curb those abuses. Steven C. Ward, Gibellina v. Handley: Toward a Federal
Approach to Voluntary Dismissals, 79 ILL. B.J. 336, 340 (1991) (stating skepticism as to whether
the case would really have its desired effect).
204. See supra Part IV (addressing how facts-particularly the attorney abuses in Rein and the
circumstances surrounding the taking and refiling of the voluntary dismissal in Hudson-should
have led the Hudson court to differentiate Rein).
205. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the intention of the Illinois General Assembly regarding
section 13-217).
206. See infra Part V (depicting the potential impacts of the Hudson case on the future
relationship between parties and the court in motion practice as well as the necessary clarification
of the voluntary dismissal statutes by the General Assembly in order to articulate the extent of a
plaintiff's right to refile voluntarily dismissed claims).
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V. IMPACT

Hudson created a rule that will consistently bar the refiling of
voluntarily dismissed claims once a court involuntarily dismisses any
other claim within the suit. 20 7 Nevertheless, this decision has other
potential implications, some of which have already been realized in
Illinois. 20 8 As Part V.A. will illustrate, Hudson will shift the balance in
motion practice by depressing a plaintiff's right to refile voluntarily

dismissed claims while giving defendants more leverage in pretrial
procedure. 20 9 An equal balance will only be maintained by judges who

recognize the effect of granting a voluntary dismissal without prejudice
and who understand whether the plaintiffs will be able to later refile the
voluntary dismissal. 2 10 Similarly, as Part V.B will demonstrate, courts'

desire to distinguish Hudson, coupled with the possible increase in
attorney malpractice claims from misuse of voluntary dismissal, will
make Hudson ineffective at reaching its goal of economizing judicial
resources.

211

A. Shifting the Balance in Motion Practice

The Hudson case has already created an imbalance of power among
parties during the pretrial stage. 2 12 The primary reason for seeking a
voluntary dismissal without prejudice is to retain the right to refile that
207. See Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 229-30 (Kilbride, J., dissenting) (addressing the major
differences between Rein and Hudson, especially in terms of attorney abuse and claim splitting, in
determining that the two cases are distinguishable and, therefore, that Hudson should have limited
Rein's holding). But see id. at 219 (majority opinion) (declining to limit Rein's holding in order
to preserve judicial economy).
208. See infra Part V.B (delineating two major effects of Hudson: (1) altering the balance in
favor of defendants in motions practice by limiting the ability of plaintiffs to pursue voluntary
dismissals and (2) failing to meet the most prevalent goal in Hudson, which was to promote
judicial economy).
209. See infra Part V.A (illustrating this imbalance further by demonstrating how a plaintiff's
ability to obtain and effectively refile a voluntarily dismissed claim depends on the mercy of the
opposing defense attorney, a situation discussed and recommended by the Hudson court).
210. See infra Part V.A (addressing the role of judges in the granting of voluntary dismissals
and how their decision making process in these circumstances must necessarily change in light of
Hudson).
211. See infra Part V.B (providing ways in which the goal of Hudson in promoting judicial
economy will not be reached on account of reactionary decisions by other courts as well as
malpractice claims arising out of the misunderstandings of attorneys and judges regarding the
effect of voluntary dismissals on a multi-claim suit).
212. See Hudson, 889 N.E.2d 210 (illustrating throughout that plaintiffs' right to refile
voluntarily dismissed claims in a multi-claim suit where an involuntary dismissal has been
entered in a previous claim is now predicate, in part, on the acquiescence of defense attorneys and
the sympathy of the courts in viewing the facts so as to fit the situation within one of the six
exceptions to the rule against claim splitting without strong consideration for an exception in the
interest of fundamental fairness).
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claim within the statutory time limit of one year.2 13 By impeding the
right to refile, plaintiffs are less likely to seek a voluntary dismissal.2 14
Specifically, plaintiffs' attorneys will now have to weigh the utility of
pleading a speculative claim against the possible need to voluntarily
dismiss and refile another claim. 2 15 This may result in the chilling of
novel, speculative claims. 2 16 Following Hudson, Illinois plaintiffs will
213. See Jerold S. Solovy, et al., Class Action Controversies, in CURRENT PROBLEMS IN
FEDERAL CIVIL TRIAL PRACTICE, 1994, at 530-31 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Prac., Course Handbook
Series, No. H4-5183, 1994) (stating that a plaintiff need not provide a defendant with notice of a
voluntary dismissal without prejudice so long as the defendant was not unduly prejudiced, and the
plaintiffs purpose was refiling the dismissed claim (citing Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298,
1314 (4th Cir. 1978))). This consideration implies that as long as the plaintiff's intention in
obtaining a voluntary dismissal is to refile the already existing claim again, the defendant
ordinarily would not be prejudiced by such a refiling. See Case v. Galesburg Cottage Hosp., 880
N.E.2d 171, 178 (111.2007) (holding that, even when the statute of limitations has run on the
initial claim, it may be refiled without notifying the defendant because of the statutory provision
allowing refiled voluntarily dismissed claims within one year under section 13-217). But see
Jeffrey A. Parness, Refiled Claims: It's Notice, Not Service, 96 ILL. B.J. 152, 154 (asserting that
defendants are often prejudiced when the statute of limitations has run on a claim and the refiling
is still allowed because of section 13-217).
214. See infra Part V.A. I (illustrating how Hudson will change the use and effect of voluntary
dismissals beginning with the pleading stage and continuing through to trial).
215. Oftentimes, plaintiffs will include claims that will be dismissed in order to challenge the
constitutionality of the law of that claim on appeal. See D. Alan Rudlin and Linsey W. Stravitz,
Novel Toxic Tort and Superfund Claims in ENVIRONMENTAL AND Toxic TORT CLAIMS:
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN 1991 AND BEYOND, at 205 (PLI Comm. L. & Prac., Course Handbook
Series No. A4-4342, 1991) (discussing how "novel theories of damages have been developed to
remedy perceived shortcomings of the traditional tort system"). See also e.g., Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954) (reinvigorating the movement for racial equality in education
with a speculative claim after Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)); Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 564 (2003) (following the decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
the plaintiffs pursued a speculative claim seeking constitutional recognition of the right to
privacy). While there is no direct indication that the plaintiffs in Hudson were attempting to
challenge the law of civil immunity, the ruling in Hudson may smother pleading that has the
potential of changing the legal status quo. See Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 220 (implying that Hudson
may limit speculative pleading).
216. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 220 ("[P]laintiffs who have both sound claims and speculative
ones may have to weigh whether it is more important to take a chance with the speculative claim
or to have a better chance of being able to maintain an absolute right to voluntarily dismiss and
refile."). There is surely some confusion regarding the definition of "speculative" in the range
from disallowed fraudulent claims to permissible novel claims. See Danielle Kie Hart, Still
Chilling After All These Years: Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedureand Its Impact on
Federal Civil Rights Plaintiffs After the 1993 Amendments, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 138 (2002)
(using "novel" as synonymous to "speculative" when discussing claims in "unsettled areas of
law"). While there are "speculative claims" that are frivolous or, at the very least, bizarre, the
mere fact that a claim is "speculative" does not mean that the claim is harassing the defendant or
the judicial system. Compare, Brief and Argument of the Plaintiff-Appellee at 3-4, Charles v.
Siegfried, 651 N.E.2d 154 (I11.1995) (No. 76617) (asserting a claim challenging the social host
liability provision in the Dram Shop Act of Illinois, which does not allow a minor who dies from
alcohol consumption at another minor's home to recover from the owner of the home where the
deceased minor was served alcohol), with Christopher Burbach, Heavens! Chambers' Suit
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be less likely to plead novel claims for fear that they will forfeit the
protection afforded by a voluntary dismissal if their speculative2 17claims
are dismissed by a judge disinclined to challenge the status quo.
As if restricting a statutory right alone was not enough, the Hudson
court gave considerable power to defendants by highlighting its
preference for defendants' acquiescence to a voluntary dismissal. 2 18 As
the Hudson court noted, another of the exceptions to the rule against
claim splitting allows a party to split its claims if the other party
"acquiesces" to the split.2 19 If a defendant refuses to allow the split, the
plaintiffs attorney will know that "he proceeds at his peril. 2 2 °
Consequently, the plaintiffs ability to obtain a voluntary dismissal
22 1
without prejudice must have the defendant's stamp of approval.
Against God Tossed Out, Judge Says There's No Way to Serve Court Papers on the Almighty,
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Oct. 15, 2008, at OIB (discussing a recent Nebraska case where a
senator sued God).
217. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 220 (discussing this possible effect of Rein and Hudson). See
also Ross B. Edwards, Hudson: New Limits on a Plaintiffs Right to Refile a Voluntarily
Dismissed Case, 96 ILL. B.J. 294, 321 (2008) (discussing the subsequent caution of plaintiffs in
pleading new claims on account of the Hudson ruling).
218. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 220 (discussing the role of defendants in the plaintiff's pursuit of
a voluntary dismissal). While the court asserted that plaintiffs may ask defendants to acquiesce to
a voluntary dismissal, defendants may also be faced with an ethical dilemma with plaintiffs who
are unaware of the effect of seeking voluntary dismissal after an involuntary dismissal has been
issued on another claim within their suit; this role is only important in cases of pro se plaintiffs.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h)(2) (2002) (discussing how an attorney is not
allowed to take advantage of an unrepresented client and must suggest that the unrepresented
person seek independent legal advice). But see Manicki v. Zeilman, 443 F.3d 922, 927 (7th Cir.
2006) (determining that the defendant had no duty to warn the plaintiff of the dangers of filing a
subsequent suit and holding that the defendant's silence was not acquiescence in this instance
because the refiling involved a purely procedural question of what issues must be raised, and
when, in a federal lawsuit).
219. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(l)(a) (1982) ("The parties have
agreed... that the plaintiff may split his claims, or the defendant has acquiesced therein."). The
comments state that when a defendant "consents, in express words or otherwise," to the split, the
defendant is not harassed or prejudiced by the split. Id. at § 26 cmt. a. Similarly, if the defendant
fails to object to the split, then the defendant has acquiesced to the split. Id. Therefore, the
argument by Justice Kilbride in the dissenting opinion of Hudson does appear to follow the
intention of the drafters of the Restatement that an agreement by both parties, even if tacit, to
allow the plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss one of their claims without prejudice would fall under
this exception to the rule against claim splitting. See Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 233 (Kilbride, J.,
dissenting) (presenting the argument in favor of the application of this exception); see also
Imperial Constr. Mgmt. Corp. v. Laborers Int'l Union of N. Am. Local 96, 729 F. Supp. 1199,
1205-06 (N.D. IIl. 1990) (determining that the "acquiescence rule" applied in Illinois when a
defendant does not file a timely objection); Disher v. Info. Res., Inc., 691 F. Supp. 75, 77 (N.D.
I11.
1988) (holding that, by not objecting to a voluntary dismissal with prejudice, the defendants
acquiesced to the splitting and subsequent proceeding involving claims under the same
transaction).
220. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 220.
221. Id. The majority only discusses the exception to the rule against claim splitting regarding
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This newly crafted imbalance of power between litigants must be

refereed by the courts, which poses problems for judges in two distinct
ways. 222 First, a voluntary dismissal must, in general, be considered
capable of refiling before the suit can be appealable because of the
223
otherwise arguable pendency of voluntarily dismissed claims.
Therefore, given the strict ruling in Hudson, courts must now actively

and accurately assess the effect of previous motions within a suit before
granting an effective voluntary dismissal without prejudice. 224 Judges
may also be required to refuse to grant voluntary dismissal without
prejudice where the voluntary dismissal cannot be refiled.225
the court's express permission of the split in a footnote at the beginning of their discussion, even
though this exception is the most applicable to the Hudson case. See id. at 216 n.2. See supra
Part IV.B. 1 (asserting that this exception does readily apply to the facts presented in Hudson).
222. See infra note 226 and accompanying text (discussing the possible recourses to
"expressly reserve" a claim for later adjudication to meet the exception to the rule against claim
splitting).
223. Valdovinos v. Luna-Manalac Med. Ctr., Ltd., 718 N.E.2d 612, 619 (ill. App. Ct. 1999)
(finding that an order granting a plaintiffs motion for voluntary dismissal "must still be capable
for enforcement before [it] can be deemed final for the purposes of appeal"). While Courts are
not generally required to concern themselves with the impact of their decisions regarding a later
res judicata bar because the effect of a final judgment can only be determined with certainty in
subsequent proceedings, voluntary dismissals pose a special problem. See Wolff, supra note 45,
at 720 ("[C]ourts regularly take it as a matter of course that the preclusive effect of a judgment is
not a subject with which a rendering court should concern itself, but, rather is a feature of a
judgment that can ... only receive serious attention-in a subsequent proceeding."). While
courts may not be able to predict the effect of their judgments, the necessity of a rendering court
to comprehend the consequences of their ruling is paramount, especially when these
consequences are not "outside the rendering forum's knowledge or control." Id. (discussing the
problems inherent with the assumption that courts do not predict the effect of their rulings).
224. See Peregrine Fin. Group, Inc. v. Ambuehl, 722 N.E.2d 723, 725 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)
(determining that the first role of the circuit court is to address "the res judicata effect of the prior
judgments"). One main concern is that the judge must consider all judgments in all preceding
motions when dealing with a routine motion to voluntarily dismiss a claim without prejudice,
especially if the suit has been transferred from another court or jurisdiction or when the prior
judgment is unpublished. See Salem M. Katsh & Alex V. Chachkes, Constitutionality of "NoCitation" Rules, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 287, 293 (2001) (discussing the difficulty of
attempting to maintain consistency when examining the effect of prior judgments on a case
presently before the court). This situation may lead to the practice of "offensive" res judicata.
See Richard B. Kennelly, Jr., Precluding the Accused: Offensive CollateralEstoppel in Criminal
Cases, 80 VA. L. REV. 1379, 1403-04 (1994) ("[l]n the second proceeding, the judge may
'nullify' by declining to accord preclusive effect to a prior judgment if doing so seems unfair.").
225. While the existence of more "activist judges" is a point of much consternation, the
necessity of judges taking more of a tutorial role may be required. See Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain,
Lawmaking and Interpretation: The Role of a Federal Judge in Our ConstitutionalFramework,
91 MARQ. L REV. 895, 896 (2008) ("[lIt has become popular for Americans of all political
persuasions to applaud the values of 'judicial restraint' while criticizing so-called 'activist
judges."'). In granting voluntary dismissals, judges will be forced to gauge the level of
understanding that each party possesses in order to make an informed decision regarding the
effect of a voluntary dismissal on the future of their case in light of Hudson, which will require a
more managerial judicial system and will be particularly difficult in cases involving pro se
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Second, as a result of Hudson, the language "without prejudice" does

not automatically allow for the refiling of a voluntarily dismissed claim,
even when the plaintiff follows all of the statutory requirements for
obtaining and refiling a voluntary dismissal. 22 6 Therefore, rather than
simply following the procedure for voluntary dismissal and refiling
under section 13-217, judges now must expressly articulate their desire
to preserve claims in order to prevent their later preclusion under res
2 27
judicata.
Thus, because Hudson will create an imbalance between plaintiffs

and defendants, individual judges must actively intervene in order to
maintain the integrity of their decisions regarding voluntary dismissals,
which will
lead to more time and money spent on motion practice in the
8
future.

22

litigants. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Authorized ManagerialismUnder the Federal Rules-And
the Extent of Convergence with Civil-Law Judging, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 191, 205-06 (2007)
(discussing the differences between three types of courts: inquisitorial, adversarial, and
managerial, concluding that American courts need to be more managerial in order to have more
control of the proceedings). While greater judicial activism is a potential solution to this
problem, the additional requirements on the courts to grant a voluntary dismissal could lead to the
abolition of the absolute right to refile voluntarily dismissed claims and of obtaining voluntary
dismissals in the first place. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (discussing the
absolute right to obtain a voluntary dismissal without prejudice under section 2-1009). However,
managerial courts are problematic for efficiency. See Kent Sinclair & Patrick Hanes, Summary
Judgment: A Proposalfor ProceduralReform in the Core Motion Context, 36 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1633, 1671 (1995) (discussing the docket burdens of a managerial court).
226. See Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 216 n.2 (discussing how the language "without prejudice" is
normally used by the court to reserve a claim for later adjudication but does not meet the
exception under the Restatement (Second) of Judgments section 26(l)(b)). The ways in which
courts "expressly reserve" a later right are varied and usually rest on common law understandings
of practices and procedures. See, e.g., Evelyn Brody, From the Dead Hand to the Living Dead:
The Conundrum of Charitable-DonorStanding,41 GA. L. REv. 1183, 1210 (2007) (discussing the
"express reservation" of a property interest through a right of reverter). The common law
understanding of the words "without prejudice" is to expressly reserve the claim. See Absolute
Dismissal, supra note 200, at 738 ("At common law a plaintiff had an absolute right to dismiss
his suit without prejudice" and refile at a later date.).
227. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(l)(b) (1982). While not addressed by this
Article, there are numerous potential problems with changing the language to allow for the
refiling of voluntarily dismissed claims: (1) the integrity of section 13-217 and (2) the general
definition of the phrase "without prejudice," which is consistently used in court orders and
legislation to denote an express reservation of rights. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the
importance of section 13-217 and the language "without prejudice" as declared by the Illinois
General Assembly and court precedent).
228. See infra Part V.B (discussing the correlation between these changes in the practice of
law to the rise in time and money spent on motion practice, specifically voluntary dismissals,
which are the most often used means of disposing of litigation).
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B. Hudson as a Goal-OrientedDecision
While clearing the docket of frivolous claims to promote judicial
economy was the articulatedgoal of the Hudson court, there is no real
evidence that the court's ruling will achieve it. 22 9 To the contrary, there
is an indication that judges will be required to spend more time and
230
resources ascertaining how and when to grant voluntary dismissals.
Already, the court has dealt with the inconsistent application of this
issue in Piagentini.23 1 Future courts may find exceptions in the Hudson
ruling given the numerous points of disagreement between the majority
and dissent. 232 Similarly, since the Hudson court never addressed the
229. Hudson v. City of Chicago, 889 N.E.2d 210, 222 (I11.2008). Politics and social science
have turned this goal into a veritable mission for cheaper and quicker litigation or, more simply, a
"better machine." Williams, supra note 193, at 607. See also Maurice Rosenberg, Court
Congestion: Status, Causes, and Proposed Remedies, in THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE
LAW EXPLOSION 29-59 (Harry W. Jones ed., 1965) (discussing the problem of crowded dockets
and various solutions proposed and implemented in response). These goals would operate
without judges "adopting efficiency as a goal" and instead focusing on substantial justice and
fairness. Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Trial Courts: An Economic Perspective, 24 L.
& SOc'Y REV 533, 544 (1990) (discussing other possibilities for promoting judicial economy
other than through judges and their individual dockets).
230. See supra Part V.A (discussing the additional obligations of judges after Hudson, which
will lead to greater time and resources allocated to deal with the new complications as a
consequence of Hudson). The additional time required will be extraordinary given the amount of
cases disposed by voluntary dismissal. See CASELOAD STATISTICS, supra note 195, at 52-54
(determining that about seventy-five percent of all cases in major cities are being disposed of by
voluntary dismissal or settlement).
231. Piagentini v. Ford Motor Co., 852 N.E.2d 356, 361 (I11. App. Ct. 2006) (distinguishing
Rein on account of the differences in facts regarding attorney abuse, the decision to appeal and
voluntarily dismiss concurrently, and the articulated policy concerns in Rein, which did not exist
in Piagentini),vacated, 886 N.E.2d 1025 (I11.2008), revised, 2009 WL 113459 (I11.App. Ct. Jan.
15, 2009.
232. See Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 220-21 (responding to the plaintiffs but not mentioning the
arguments posed by the dissenting opinion). One of these differing opinions is whether a refiled
voluntarily dismissed claim is a new action. See id. at 214, 228 (Kilbride, J., dissenting)
(discussing the differing analyses of the effect of a refiled voluntarily dismissed claim). When a
plaintiff refiles his previously voluntarily dismissed claim under section 13-217, the refiling
constitutes a "new action." See Moran v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 907 F. Supp. 1228, 1229 (N.D. Ill.
1995) (determining that plaintiffs began a "new action" under the Illinois voluntary dismissal
statute); Neuman v. Burstein, 595 N.E.2d 659, 662 (I11.App. Ct. 1992) (determining that a refiled
action was a "new action"). This rule also applies when a refiled voluntarily dismissed action is
based on the same core of operative facts as a pending action in a different court. See Schrager v.
Grossman, 752 N.E.2d 1, 6 (I11.App. Ct. 2000) (holding that a state court action based on same
core of operative facts as pending federal action was a "new action"). In both circumstances,
while the refiled count is a "new action" under section 13-217, none of the cases discussed
whether a new action under 13-217 is a continuation of the voluntarily dismissed count or
whether the new action is a new case entirely for res judicata purposes. See Hudson, 889 N.E.2d
at 227 ("This court has also been less than clear in determining whether a plaintiff's refiled
complaint constitutes a new action or a continuation of a voluntarily dismissed action."). The
dissenting opinion in Hudson discusses this issue at length and concludes that the refiled count is
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fundamental fairness exception to the rule against claim splitting in its
this exception without explicitly
analysis, future courts may apply
2 33
disregarding the ruling in Hudson.
Further, considering the fact that the plaintiffs in Hudson are now
234
suing their attorney, there may be an effect on attorney liability.
Attorneys' potential liability to their clients will now be a major
concern, not only for failing to bring a cause of action that applied to a
particular case, but for bringing a cause of action that was involuntarily
dismissed, thus barring any possible recovery on a subsequently
voluntarily dismissed claim. 2 35 Given these uncertainties created in the
a
wake of Hudson, the volume of potential malpractice claims may pose
236
problem to judicial economy not addressed in the court's decision.

considered a continuation of the voluntarily dismissed action; therefore, it is not impermissible
claim splitting under the doctrine of res judicata. Id. at 227-28.
233. See Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 220 (discussing the six exceptions to the rule against claim
splitting without mentioning this common law exception). See also supra Part IV.B.2 (detailing
the exception to the rule against claim splitting on account of fundamental fairness and addressing
how that exception applied to Hudson). This problem of fundamental fairness becomes
especially difficult when dealing with unexpected life changes, as was the case in Hudson, and
with pro se litigants who may not be aware of the consequences of their decision to pursue a
voluntary dismissal without prejudice after Hudson. See supra note 225 and accompanying text
(discussing the role of the courts in dealing with respective knowledge of parties, including pro se
plaintiffs).
234. Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 217 (inserting, in brackets, the cause of action from Hudson into
the verbatim reasoning from Rein, stating that the court must "simply insert the case names and
the types of counts from this new case into the above-quoted passage from Rein" (citing Rein v.
David A. Noyes & Co., 665 N.E.2d 1199, 1205-06 (111. 1996))). While judges who grant
ineffective voluntary dismissals probably will not face any personal repercussions (since judges
have immunity from mistaken misapplication of precedent), this situation may change given the
fact that so many cases are disposed of through voluntary dismissal specifically intended to be
refiled at a later date. See David R. Cohen, Judicial Malpractice Insurance? The Judiciary
Responds to the Loss of Absolute Immunity, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 267, 274-76 (1990)
(discussing the changes to judicial immunity as well as the potential necessity of malpractice
insurance).
235. See Hudson 889 N.E.2d at 219 n.4 (noting, in a footnote, defendant's request that the
court take judicial notice of Case Number 04-L-008252, in which the plaintiffs from Hudson are
attempting to sue their attcrney for malpractice for failing to appeal the involuntary dismissal of
their negligence count). This particular case is extremely worrisome, seeing as though one of the
distinctions between Rein and Hudson was that the involuntarily dismissed claim in Hudson was
never pursued beyond the dismissal and, therefore, the voluntary dismissal was not merely used
as a tool to maintain two different causes of action in two different courts, which is clearly barred
by the rule against claim splitting.
236. See supra Part V.A (discussing the imbalance between plaintiffs' attorneys, defense
attorneys, and judges in motion practice regarding voluntary dismissals as well as the difficult
situations that now face these three groups of lawyers when determining whether to take
voluntary dismissals and how to apply the taking of a voluntary dismissal at later points in the
litigation).
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Thus, when considering the effect of its judgment, the Hudson court
appeared unconcerned with the vast changes in motion practice and the
237
general imbalance that the holding would invariably create.
Regardless of this oversight, Hudson will have a lasting impact on
motion practice and, ultimately, will not meet the court's goal of
238
promoting judicial economy.
VI. CONCLUSION

While the goal of an efficient judicial system is important, it must be
balanced against the rights of litigants and the courts' responsibility to
ensure an accurate and fair civil justice system. When coupled with the
Illinois General Assembly's intent to allow the refiling of voluntarily
dismissed claims, the Hudson court's decision to bar plaintiffs from
refiling these claims once an involuntary dismissal has been reached on
any other claim within the suit is difficult to understand. Whether the
court or the General Assembly attempts to rectify this imbalance, there
will be a dramatic power shift for Illinois litigants at the motion stage
that will affect how courts and attorneys handle the cases before them.

237. See Hudson, 889 N.E.2d at 220 (discussing the few implications of its decision, the court
mentioned the potential for these negative effects but rejected them as compelling in light of

promoting judicial economy).
238. While Illinois courts have already started using Hudson as a reason to promote judicial
economy, the fact remains that Hudson will not reduce the rising number of claims filed. See
Treadway v. Nations Credit Fin. Serv. Corp., 892 N.E.2d 534, 542 (111.App. Ct. 2008) (using

Hudson to assert the application of res judicata to bar a complaint "in the interests of judicial
economy"), appeal denied, 2008 Ill.
LEXIS 1591 (I11.
2008).

